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BOLD PROMISES BUT BABY STEPS: MARYLAND'S 
GROWTH POLICY TO THE YEAR 2020 
Philip J. Tierneyt 
I. BACKGROUND: THE VISIONS OF 2020 
The Chesapeake Bay (the Bay) is the nation's major estuarine 
system and its 64,000 square mile watershed includes portions of six 
states.· The Bay represents an enormous economic resource with 
impact along the entire eastern seaboard;2 its commercial and recre-
ational amenities are responsible for attracting many of the fifteen 
million people who reside within its watershed. 3 Yet poorly regulated 
development is destroying huge chunks of farmland, forests, and 
environmentally sensitive areas which directly affect the Bay, 4 and 
these development patterns threaten its environmental health. 5 Mary-
land alone is predicted to lose 240,000 acres of farmland and 307,000 
t B.S., University of Notre Dame, 1958; J.D., Catholic University of America, 
1968. Mr. Tierney is Director of the Office of Zoning and Administrative 
Hearings for Montgomery County, Maryland, as well as a member of the 
adjunct faculties at the University of Baltimore School of Law and Washington 
College of Law of the American University where he teaches courses in land 
use law. This Article represents the opinions of the author and does not 
necessarily represent the views of Montgomery County Government, the Uni-
versity of Baltimore, or the American University. 
The author gratefully acknowledges the encouragement and helpful com-
ments provided on earlier versions of this Article by land use law colleagues 
Stanley D. Abrams, John J. Delaney, Shelley Wasserman, and Peter Max 
Zimmerman, as well as the valuable review and editorial work provided by 
University of Baltimore law students Elizabeth Stanat and Heidi Levine. This 
assistance improved the clarity and content of the Article. The author is solely 
responsible for remaining deficiencies. 
I. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON GROWTH IN THE CHESAPEAKE BAY REGION PRO-
TECTING THE FUTURE: A VISION FOR MARYLAND, at 7 (Jan. 1991) [hereinafter 
BAY REPORT]. 
2. RANDALL T. KERHIN, ET AL., REPORT ON THE CHESAPEAKE BAY EARTH SCIENCE 
STUDY, MARYLAND GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 3 (Spring 1977) [hereinafter BAY STUDY). 
3. BAY STUDY, supra note 2, at 3; THE YEAR 2020 PANEL, POPULATION GROWTH 
AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE CHESAPEAKE BAY WATERSHED TO THE YEAR 2020, 
at 25 (Dec. 1988) [hereinafter 2020 REPORT); Invitation to Join, Chesapeake 
Bay Foundation Fact Sheet, at I (Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Annapolis, 
Md.) (1991) (on file with author). 
4. See 2020 REPORT, supra note 3, at 29-30; see also BAY REPORT, supra note I, 
at 7. 
5. ECONOMIC GROWTH, RESOURCE PROTECTION, & PLANNING COMMISSION, 1993 
REPORT, at 34-35 (Dec. I, 1993) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT). 
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acres of forests to development by the year 2020. 6 To save the Bay, 
growth must be redirected to areas more suitable for development. 7 
For approximately seventy years, most states8 relinquished re-
sponsibility for planning and land use regulation to local govern-
ments.9 While some local governments generated innovative land use 
regulations designed to promote environmental objectives,1O most 
localities contributed to environmental degradation through lax reg-
ulation of development motivated primarily by economic considera-
tions and parochial attitudes .. 1 Since the 1950s, these lax regulatory 
6. BAY REPORT, supra note I, at 7; BAY STUDY, supra note 2, at 3; 2020 REPORT, 
supra note 3, at 18-24; Tom Horton, The Last Skipjack, N.Y. TIMES MAG., 
June 13, 1993, at 32. 
7. See, e.g., BAY REPORT, supra note I, at 9-12; BAY STUDY, supra note 2, at 3; 
2020 REPORT, supra note 3, at 35-40. 
8. State enabling laws were adopted during the 1920s and local governments were 
generally delegated full planning and zoning responsibilities. Since the 1970s, 
a growing number of states have retrieved some of this responsibility in order 
to address regional and environmental concerns. See Frank J. Popper, Under-
standing American Land Use Regulation Since 1970, J. OF THE AM. PLAN. 
ASS'N, Spring 1988, at 291; see also 2020 REPORT, supra note 3, at 2-4. 
9. See Popper, supra note 8, at 291. On the whole, local governments have an 
undistinguished record in exercising this delegated responsibility, especially with 
respect to environmental and regional concerns. JOHN M. DEGROVE, NEW 
FRONTIER FOR LAND POLICy-PLANNING AND GROWTH MANAGEMENT IN THE 
STATES 2 (1992); Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden, Zoning After 70 Years, 
N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 24, 1986, at A19. 
10. These innovative techniques are discussed in Part IV of this Article. They were 
all developed by local governments. This is one of the major successes of local 
land use regulation. Haar & Kayden, supra note 9. 
II. 2020 REPORT, supra note 3, at 2. Tom Horton, an author and leading advocate 
for sensible and managed growth, recently observed: 
Imagine that we had set out a couple of decades ago to protect the 
nation's air and water without any national Clean Air Act or Clean 
Water Act. Imagine that we had, instead, left it up to county com-
missions, boards of supervisors and town councils across the land. It 
would have been a polluter's dream: localities by the thousands 
relaxing and waiving environmental standards to keep or attract 
industry; rural officials succumbing to the onslaught of corporations 
with bottomless legal and financial resources; a bewildering hodge-
podge of air-and water-quality rules, ranging from downright exclu-
sionary to anything goes. 
It would have been a mess. 
Yet this same parochial approach to environmental protection, 
long ago deemed disastrous for our air and water, has been zealously 
enshrined for the protection of land-the third pillar of environmental 
quality. "Local control" is the mantra here, and with few exceptions, 
land use is controlled by counties and towns. 
And it has been a mess. 
Of course, land is different, the argument often goes. For the 
most part, land is privately and locally owned, and thus rightly a 
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patterns have produced unplanned sprawl development l2 with unin-
tended but harmful environmental consequences,l3 while other more 
suitable areas have been bypassed. 14 Sprawl development places un-
local issue. But the environmental impacts of poor land use are no 
more private, or confined to political boundaries, than the ashy plume 
from a tall smokestack, or the discharge from a sewage plant washing 
downstream. 
Tom Horton, An Ounce oj Prevention, MID-ATLANTIC COUNTRY, July 1993, 
at 24. 
12. Sprawl development is described in the following manner: "Under the sprawl 
pattern of development, new growth would follow its present trend of expanding 
outward in all directions at low densities, seeking always the lowest priced 
land. Sprawl takes place naturally in the absence of energetic and coordinated 
public policies to guide new growth .... " THE MARYLAND NATIONAL CAPITAL 
PARK & PLANNING COMM'N, ... ON WEDGES AND CORRIDORs-A GENERAL 
PLAN FOR THE MARYLAND-WASHINGTON REGIONAL DISTRICT 136 (Jan. 22, 1964) 
[hereinafter GENERAL PLAN). James W. Rouse, the developer of Columbia, 
Maryland, and the New Town located in central Howard County, described 
sprawl from a developer's viewpoint: "Sprawl is inefficient. It stretches out 
the distances people must travel to work, to shop, to worship, to play .... 
Sprawl is ugly, oppressive, massively dull. It squanders the resources of nature-
forests, streams, hillsides-and produces vast, monotonous armies of housing 
and graceless, tasteless clutter." James W. Rouse, Cities that Work for Man-
Victory Ahead, Address at the Lion's International/University of Puerto Rico 
Symposium on "The City of the Future" 2 (Oct. 18, 1967) (on file with 
author). 
Local governments are motivated to promote sprawl by economic consid-
erations including an increased tax base. High income residents generally occupy 
the homes built in these low density areas and the housing patterns established 
by sprawl generally discourage affordable housing. See HOWARD COUNTY 1990 
GENERAL PLAN, A SIX POINT PLAN FOR THE FUTURE 59 (July 2, 1990). 
13. These consequences include toxic runoff, loss of pervious surfaces, increased 
sedimentation and soil erosion, and water pollution. BAY REPORT, supra note 
I, at 7; see also DEGRovE, supra note 9, at 18, 34; Beach Pollution Watch, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 1994, at A9 (Maryland ranked fifth in the number of 
beach closings due to polluted water in 1993). 
14. See, e.g., 2020 REPORT, supra note 3, at 18-19; Tom Horton, This Land Is 
My Land, MID-ATLANTIC COUNTRY, May 1993, at 22. Horton vividly portrays 
the problem: 
At local levels, where most of the land-use power resides, we zone 
virtually every acre of our farmland and forest land for residential 
lots, then wonder why growth occurs willy-nilly, and not in the areas 
where it makes sense-in the areas where development, and the sewers 
and roads and schools to serve it, already exist. 
The result is sprawl development and strip malls that chew up 
huge amounts of remaining natural lands, erode our agricultural base, 
suck the commercial life out of our cities and small towns, and are 
just downright ugly. To compensate, we regulate piecemeal at the 
state and federal level-protecting trees, protecting shoreline, protect-
ing farmland, protecting wetlands. Given the mess we have made of 
planning and zoning for growth, this band-aid approach is a necessary 
alternative to environmental deterioration. 
[d. at 25. 
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anticipated burdens on local governments in the form of infrastruc-
ture overload as roads, schools, and other public facilities are stretched 
beyond their intended capacities. 15 Sprawl development encourages 
the migration of high income residents from the cities to suburbia 16 
and, as a result, the central cities are experiencing declining popu-
lation, decreased tax base, and waning political influence.17 These 
trends threaten long term social and environmental problems. 
The harmful environmental consequences of unmanaged growth 
prompted state action, particularly in Maryland, which is the most 
affected by the environmental degradation of the Bay because it is 
host to the largest portion of Bay waters. IS Since 1970, Maryland 
has adopted a number of environmental laws including wetlands 
protection,19 state control over water and sewage programs,20 tree 
preservation,21 farmland preservation,22 and a regional critical area 
program that curtails development within one thousand feet of af-
fected waters and wetlands. 23 While these piecemeal programs achieved 
limited success in addressing their particular problems, other more 
comprehensive remedies are necessary to adequately protect the Bay 
from the consequences of unmanaged growth. 24 
15. The belief that sprawl development is an economic benefit for local governments 
may be based on invalid assumptions. A study of the government of Loudon 
County, Virginia, concluded that the fiscal impact of sprawl development on 
local government exceeds the increased public revenue from an expanded tax 
base. AMERICAN FARMLAND TRUST, DENSITy-RELATED PUBLIC COSTS 5-6 (1986); 
see also DEGROVE, supra note 9, at 9, 14, 34; GENERAL PLAN, supra note 12, 
at 136. 
16. See GENERAL PLAN, supra note 12, at 136. 
17. The fragmentation of metropolitan areas has magnified the gap between growth 
and local government's capacity to respond with a consistent and rational 
growth policy for the efficient allocation of resources. Michael deCourcy Hinds 
& Erik Eckholm, 80s Legacy: States and Cities in Need, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 
1990, § 1, at 1; see Marshall V. Kaplan & Peggy Cuciti, Reconciling Fragmented 
Local Government and Infrastructure Services, LAND USE IN TRANSITION (Urban 
Land Institute, Washington, D.C.), 1993, at 26-31; David Rusk, Suburban 
Renewal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1993, at A23; Roberto Suro, Where America 
Is Growing: The Suburban Cities, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23,1991, § I, at 1; Roberto 
Suro, Where Have All the Jobs Gone? Follow the Crab Grass, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 3, 1991, § 4, at 5; Barbara Vobejda, Half of Population Lives in Urban 
Areas, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 1991, at AI. 
18. About 1,726 square miles, which is more than half the Bay, lies within 
Maryland. DIANE P. FRESE, ET AL., MARYLAND MANUAL, A GUIDE TO MARY-
LAND GOVERNMENT 2 (1991-92). 
19. MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. §§ 9-101 to 9-502,8-1201 to 8-1211 (1990 & Supp. 
1994). 
20. MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. § 8-1204 (1990 & Supp. 1994). 
21. MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. §§ 5-1601 to 5-1613 (Supp. 1994). 
22. MD. CODE ANN., AGRIC. §§ 2-501 to 2-516 (1985 & Supp. 1994). 
23. MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. §§ 8-1801 to 8-1816 (1990 & Supp. 1994); COMAR 
§§ 14.15.01 to 14.15.07. 
24. 2020 REPORT, supra note 3, at 13-15; Terry J. Harris, The Frightening Future 
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To this end, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia formed the 
Chesapeake Bay Commission to coordinate legislative planning and 
programs to restore the Bay.2s On December 14, 1987, the Chesapeake 
Bay Agreement was signed by representatives of the Chesapeake Bay 
Commission, the District of Columbia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, 
Virginia, and the United States Environmental Protection Agency.26 
This Agreement commissioned a one year study to evaluate antici-
pated growth issues through the year 2020 and a distinguished panel 
was assigned the task of developing strategies to alter traditional 
growth patternsY 
The Year 2020 Panel (the 2020 Panel) concluded that continu-
ation of existing development patterns and unmanaged growth will 
result in serious damage to the Bay unless bold measures are imple-
mented. 28 The 2020 Panel devised six strategic policies which have 
come to be known as the "Visions of 2020": (1) development is to 
be concentrated in suitable areas; (2) sensitive areas are to be pro-
tected; (3) growth is to be directed to existing population centers in 
rural areas, and resource areas are to be protected; (4) stewardship 
of the Bay and the land is to be a universal ethic; (5) conservation 
of resources is to be a regional priority; and (6) funding mechanisms 
are to be in place to achieve all other visions. 29 The 2020 Panel 
determined that these policies would be best achieved through a 
of the Chesapeake Bay, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 1991, at 08; Horton also offers 
some comprehensive proposals: 
For any widespread and sustained change in our land-use dilemma, 
several things have to happen: 
Some form of control or oversight must be instituted at a regional 
or state level. States already have clear legal authority to do this, and 
eight of them, including New Jersey, have now enacted some form 
of comprehensive land-use law. We must be willing to put significant 
portions of our agricultural and forest lands off limits to most 
development-not just zone them for two-to-five acre residential lots. 
As long as farmers can still farm, and timber companies can still cut 
timber, this does not amount to an illegal "taking," as some property-
rights activists charge. If such land has already been subdivided and 
approved for development, compensation might be called for. Devel-
opers have to be allowed much freer range to create livable, high-
density, mixed-use projects in areas where it makes sense for growth 
to occur. This may prove more difficult than protecting open space, 
since it is common for residents of towns to reject any proposals to 
add density. All too often, sprawl happens because it is the path of 
least resistance. 
Horton, supra note II, at 24. 
25. DIANE P. FRESE, ET AL., MARYLAND MANUAL, A GUIDE TO MARYLAND Gov-
ERNMENT 17 (1991-92). 
26. [d. 
27. 2020 REPORT, supra note 3, at 15. 
28. [d. at I. 
29. [d. at 4-8. 
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regulatory system that includes state initiated land use policies and 
standards that are applied to local governments in a mandatory 
fashion and result in clearly defined areas designated for growth and 
protection. 30 The 2020 Panel charged Maryland with the responsibility 
for adopting a statewide comprehensive plan and developing criteria 
to achieve consistency between the state plan and local actions.3) 
Thus began a three year struggle to define Maryland's role in a 
planning and regulatory process traditionally operated by local gov-
ernments. In late 1989, the Governor appointed a thirty-three member 
commission responsible for evaluating the role of the state in directing 
growth and development in a manner that will achieve the Visions 
of 2020.32 The Barnes Commission33 spent sixteen months conducting 
evaluations of development strategies and holding public hearings 
throughout Maryland. 34 Its report, published in January 1991, con-
cluded that Maryland's population will increase by one million by 
the year 2020, that sprawl development is a major contributing factor 
in the loss of farms and forests and pollution of the Bay, and that 
the threat of unmanaged growth to the Bay watershed is so substantial 
that a statewide land use regulatory system is needed to successfully 
implement the Visions of 2020.35 
The major elements of the Barnes Commission recommendations 
were proposed by the Governor as administration bills during the 
1991 session of the Maryland General Assembly. 36 These bills (the 
2020 Bills) included the Visions of 2020 as the strategic policies of 
the state,37 and proposed a system of mandatory local planning and 
zoning to be implemented under a statewide land use classification 
system38 that divided local jurisdictions into four broad overlay zoning 
districts: rural and resource areas, sensitive areas, developed areas, 
30. [d. at 16-18. 
31. [d. at 49-50. 
32. Liz Bowie, Commission To Study Growth in Chesapeake Bay Region, THE 
SUN (Balt.), Oct. 11, 1989, at 3D. 
33. The Commission was nicknamed the Barnes Commission after its Chairman, 
former United States Congressman from Montgomery County, ·Michael D. 
Barnes. 
34. MARYLAND OFFICE OF PLANNiNG, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT, PLANNING WORKS 4 
(1992) [hereinafter PLANNING WORKS). 
35 .. See BAY REPORT, supra note 1, at 7-16. 
36. Senate Bill 227, S. 227, 1991 Sess. (Md. 1991), and House Bill 214, H.D. 214, 
1991 Sess. (Md. 1991), were introduced as administration bills by the President 
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House, respectively, on January 21, 1991, 
and were quickly given the nickname "2020." M. Dion Thompson, County 
Commissioners, Farmers Decry Chesapeake Bay Preservation Bill, THE SUN 
(Bait.), Feb. 27, 1991, at 2C. 
37. S. 227, 1991 Sess. (Md. 1991); H.D. 214, 1991 Sess. (Md. 1991). 
38. S. 227, 1991 Sess. §§ 15-203, 15-207, 15-303 (Md. 1991). 
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and areas suitable for growth.39 Standards for sensitive areas were 
included in the 2020 Bills,40 while standards for the other classifica-
tions were proposed for adoption by executive regulation.41 The 2020 
Bills required local governments to adopt plans and programs con-
sistent with the land use classification system and the standards 
proscribed for each zoning district. 42 Enforcement was keyed to a 
state certification process and involved the Office of Planning in the 
review and approval of local plans and programs.43 A dispute reso-
lution process was included to address conflicts over certification 
decisions. 44 An infrastructure fund was proposed to finance· desired 
levels of growth beyond the capacity of particular local governments 
and fund allocations were to be determined by formula grants,45 
measured by the wealth of local government,46 and incentive grants.47 
The proposed 2020 Bills introduced a major state presence into 
a field that was all too frequently characterized by lax regulation 
and parochialism.48 The 2020 Bills would replace a hodgepodge of 
local regulations with consistent state policies and standards.49 These 
Bills followed the recommendations of the 2020 Panel,50 and a 
growing trend of state regulatory initiatives adopted elsewhere51 and 
39. [d. §§ 15-203, 15-204. 
40. Id. § 15-204. 
41. [d. § 15-203. The Commission had initially proposed standards for legislative 
consideration which were deleted from the Governor's bills. See id. §§ 15-204 
to 15-206. 
42. S. 227, 1991 Sess. § 15-206 (Md. 1991); H.D. 214, 1991 Sess. § 13-207 (Md. 
1991). 
43. S. 227, 1991 Sess. § 15-208 (Md. 1991). 
44. [d. § 15-404. 
45. [d. § 15-601(0. 
46. [d. § 15-601(g). 
47. [d. § 15-605. 
48. See generally, Horton, supra note 11. The element of greed is also a factor 
sometimes present in the land use regulatory process as illustrated by Maryland's 
periodic history of political corruption by local zoning officials that prompted 
the state legislature and the courts to adopt a number of reforms that include 
among other requirements: open meetings, MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T §§ 
10-501 to 10-512 (1993 & Supp. 1994); public ethics and financial disclosure 
requirements, MD. ANN. CODE art. 40A, §§ 1-101 to 7-104 (1993 & Supp. 
1994); and adjudicatory safeguards, Hyson v. Montgomery County Council, 
242 Md. 55, 217 A.2d 578 (1966); Ocean Hideaway Condominium Ass'n v. 
Boardwalk Plaza Ventures, 68 Md. App. 650, 515 A.2d 485 (1986). 
49. Shelly S. Wasserman, Managing 'Growth, MARYLAND B. J., Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 
12, 13. 
50. The 2020 Panel urged the adoption of state initiated policies and standards, 
mandatorily imposed on local governments, and which clearly define growth 
and protected areas. 2020 REPORT, supra note 3, at 16-17, 44-48. The 2020 
Panel proposals satisfied all three objectives. 
51. [d.; Wasserman, supra note 49, at 13-16. 
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in Maryland under the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area ProgramY 
The provisions for statewide standards and stringent state over-
sight were the most controversial parts of the 2020 Bills and eventually 
led to their defeat. 53 The response to the Bills was swift and clam-
orous. Property rights advocates, developers, financial organizations, 
farmers, the Maryland Municipal League, and the Maryland Asso-
ciation of Counties joined forces to form a solid and effective 
opposition to the 2020 BillsY The Bills were defeated in committees 
by lopsided margins;55 and the matter was referred to a summer 
study committee of the General Assembly. 56 
A compromise emerged from the 1991 summer study which 
secured agreement on the Visions of 2020 as strategic state policy 
and provided for the policy to be mandatory on local governments, 
but retreated from state-initiated standards, oversight, and enforce-
. mentY The compromise left local goveniments with the sole respon-
sibility to define growth and protected areas and develop 
implementation measures to apply state policy. 58 The compromise 
approach was enacted into law during the 1992 session.59 
52. This regional program of limited application employs state initiated policies 
and standards that are mandatory for certain local governments. MD. CODE 
ANN., NAT. RES. §§ 8-1801 to 8-1816 (1990 & Supp~ 1994); see Bellanca v. 
Comm'rs of Kent County, 86 Md. App. 219, 586 A.2d 62, cert. denied, 323 
Md. 33, 591 A.2d 249 (1991). 
53. Howard Schneider, Maryland Assembly Kiffs Plan To Curb Growth; Environ-
mentalists, Schaefer Rebuffed, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 1991, at BI. 
54. PLANNING WORKS, supra note 34, at 2; Howard Schneider, Views on Maryland 
Growth Control Plan Range from 'Threat' to 'Vision', WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 
1991, at 03; Roll, GrOWTh Biff Draws Fire from Builders, Farmers, MONTGO-
MERY JOURNAL, Feb. 27, 1991, at A5; M. Dion Thompson, CounTy Commis-
sioners, Farmers Decry Chesapeake Bay Preservation Bill, THE SUN (Balt.), 
Feb. 27, 1991, at 2C. 
55. The Senate Bill failed on a vote of 10-1 in the Senate Economic and Environ-
mental Matters Committee on March 14, 1991. The House of Delegates version 
failed on a vote of 18-4 in the House Environmental Matters Committee on 
the same day. C. Fraser Smith, 2020 Proposal To Govern Maryland GrOWTh 
Put Off, Schaefer InitiaTive Rebuffed by HOllse, SenaTe Committees, THE SUN 
(Bait.), Mar. 15, 1991, at AI. 
56. The clamorous opposition to the 2020 proposals overshadowed strong support 
from environmental groups which gave the legislature concern about an outright 
rejection of the state regulatory concept. Consequently, the legislative leadership 
pledged a comprehensive study during the summer of 1991 using the 2020 
proposals as a starting poin t. Howard Schneider, Maryland Assembly Kills 
Plan To Curb Growth; Environmentalists, Schaefer Rebuffed, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 15, 1991, at BI. 
57. James D. Lawler, Maryland: Growth Control Revisited, PLANNING (American 
Planning Ass'n), Jan. 1992, at 5. 
58. Id. 
59. House Bill 1195, H.D. 1195,1992 Sess. (Md. 1992), was enacted by the General 
Assembly of Maryland in 1992 as Section 2, Chapter 437, of the 1992 Laws 
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This Article examines the new requirements of Maryland's law, 
both the strengths and weaknesses, and proposes amendments nec-
essary to fully achieve state policy. The new requirement for man-
datory consistency between state policy and local actions and the 
new authorization for use of flexible techniques to implement the 
state policy will challenge both state and local governments to develop 
innovative regulatory measures. Potential impediments to implemen-
tation of the state policy need to be overcome through careful 
regulation and further legislation. The new law offers a modest 
beginning in developing a process under which more sensible land 
use patterns may emerge. 
II. THE PLANNING ACT REQUIREMENTS 
The adoption of the Maryland Economic Growth, Resource 
Protection, and Planning Act of 1992 (the Planning Act),60 resolved 
the debate on what framework will be used to balance the sometimes 
competing objectives of economic development, growth management, 
and environmental protection. Both the 2020 Panel and the Barnes 
Commission proposed a top-down approach where the state sets the 
goals, program content, and standards that are implemented at the 
local leve1.61 The Planning Act adopted a bottom-up approach where 
the program content, standards, and implementation are developed 
at the local level subject to generalized state policy and state oversight 
with respect to format and timing. The bottom-up approach repre-
sents a concession to the political aspects of the locally based planning 
process and the difficulties of interfering with that process62 and, like 
many compromise measures, contains both strengths and weaknesses 
with respect to its potential implementation. 
The major strengths of the legislation include a new comprehen-
sive growth policy, mandatory application of the policy on local 
governments, a state oversight mechanism to monitor compliance, a 
consistency requirement, and new authorization for use of flexible 
of Maryland, 1992 Md. Laws § 2, ch. 437, now codified at MD. ANN. CODE 
art. 66B (Supp. 1994), and MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. (Supp. 1994). 
House Bill 457, H.D. 457, 1992 Sess. (Md. 1992), was enacted by the General 
Assembly of Maryland in 1992 as Section 2, Chapter 436, of the 1992 Laws 
of Maryland, 1992 Md. Laws § 2, ch. 436, now codified as MD. ANN. CODE 
art. 66B § 10.01 (Supp. 1994). 
60. H.D. 1195, 1992 Sess. (Md. 1992). 
61. S. 227, 1991 Sess. (Md. 1991); H.D. 214, 1991 Sess. (Md. 1991); 2020 REPORT, 
supra note 3, at 16-17. This approach follows the more successful state 
programs. See DEGRovE, supra note 9, at 2-14. 
62. Horton, supra note II, at 24. 
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techniques. These last two implementation measures provide signifi-
cant potential for successful application of state policy if properly 
applied and, because of their significance, each measure is discussed 
separately in Parts III and IV of this Article. 
The Planning Act establishes strategic policies which collectively 
constitute the state growth policy. This growth policy is designed to 
promote the long-term environmental and economic health of the 
region.63 The new state growth policy largely incorporates the six 
components of the Visions of 2020 and requires development to be 
located in areas where it makes sense-where roads, schools, and 
other public facilities and services already exist-and to avoid areas 
where development would cause environmental harm.64 Specifically, 
the new policy requires that local governments concentrate develop-
ment in suitable areas65 and protect sensitive,66 rural,67 and resource 
areas. 68 The legislation also encourages economic development through 
streamlined regulatory mechanisms,69 and calls for the removal of 
administrative impediments in the development review process for 
those areas designated as suitable for growth.70 A provision for 
affordable housing was also added as an element of state policy by 
separate legislation. 71 The state growth policy represents a bold ini-
tiative designed to change the way land use is regulated at the local 
level. The new policy seeks to eliminate sprawl development, the 
most environmentally destructive form of development. 72 The success 
of the policy, however, depends on the effectiveness of the imple-
mentation programs in applying the policy as it was intended. 
The Planning Act provides a mandatory process under which 
local governments adopt comprehensive plans73 and modify local 
regulations to be consistent with state policy. 74 Local governments 
are also encouraged to use innovative and flexible techniques to 
achieve state policy. 75 The Planning Act explicitly requires local 
governments to protect sensitive areas. 76 All local comprehensive plans 
63. MD. ANN. CODE art. 668, § 3.06 (Supp. 1994); MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. 
& PROC. § 5-7 A-O I (Supp. 1994). 
64. Horton forcefully describes the need for the policy. Horton, supra note II, at 
25. 
65. MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 5-7A-OI(1) (Supp. 1994). 
66. [d. § 5-7A-OI(2). 
67. [d. § 5-7A-OI(3). 
68. [d. § 5-7A-Ol(5). 
69. [d. § 5-7A-OI(6). 
70. MD. ANN. CODE art. 668, § 3.05(a)(l)(vi)(1) (Supp. 1994). 
71. H.D. 457, 1992 Sess. (Md. 1992). 
72. DEGRovE, supra note 9, at 9, 14, 34. 
73. MD. ANN. CODE art. 668, § 3.06(b) (Supp. 1994). 
74. [d. § 4.09. 
75. [d. § 3 .05(a)(1 )(vi). 
76. [d. § 3.06(b), (c). 
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must include protection for streams' and stream buffers, IOO-year 
floodplains, endangered species habitats, steep slopes, and other 
sensitive areas that local governments may determine to be in need 
of protection from adverse impacts of development. 77 Local plans 
must also include recommendations to streamline the development 
review process and to use flexible, innovative, and cost saving tech-
niques that foster economic development. 78 
By July 1, 1997, all local governments must adopt comprehensive 
plans consistent with the state growth policy. 79 These local plans then 
serve as the basis for all regulatory actions within each jurisdiction.80 
Zoning and subdivision regulations must be made consistent with the 
plans,81 and therefore consistent with the state growth policy. Com-
prehensive zoning may be required to apply plan recommendations. 82 
Presumably all comprehensive and piecemeal zoning map amend-
ments, which form a part of the zoning regulations, must be consis-
tent with both local plans and state policy. 83 
Another important strength contained in the Planning Act is 
state oversight in the form of a new state agency, the Economic 
Growth, Resource Protection, and Planning Commission (the Com-
mission), with responsibilities for monitoring, reviewing, and report-
ing on the performance of local governments.84 The Commission 
77. Id. § 3.06(b). 
78. Id. § 3.05(a)(l)(vi). 
79. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 3.05(b) (Supp. 1994). 
80. Id. § 4.09. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Maryland follows the view that both comprehensive and piecemeal zoning are 
legislative in nature and form an integral part of the local zoning regulations. 
See Hyson v. Montgomery County Council, 242 Md. 55, 63, 217 A.2d 573, 
583 (1966); Huff v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Baltimore County, 214 Md. 
48, 66, 133 A.2d 83, 93 (1957) (Henderson, J., dissenting); see also Udell v. 
Haas, 235 N.E.2d 897, 902 (N.Y. 1968). 
84. MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC., §§ 5-702, 5-708 (Supp. 1994). The 
Commission, which was appointed in March, 1993, is composed of 17 members 
serving two and four year terms. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at I. The 
membership represents regions and interest groups from throughout the state. 
MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 5-703 (Supp. 1994). Two members 
are appointed by the House and Senate and 15 members appointed by the 
Governor from the following categories: two members representing the Mary-
land Associ,ation of Counties, one member re'presenting the Maryland Municipal 
League, and ten members from seven specific regions of the state. Id. § 5-703. 
The Governor is urged to select membership from business, finance, agriculture, 
forestry, environmental, civic, planning, and real estate development interests. 
Id. § 5-703(a)(3). The Commission must establish at least four subcommittees 
the responsibilities and membership of which are mandated by statute. Id. § 
5-707. The Committee on Interjurisdictional Coordination must promote co-
ordination and cooperation among all jurisdictions consistent with the state 
/ 
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must also formulate proposals for changes in the law as deemed 
necessary to achieve the state growth policy, 8S assure that policy goals 
are attained,86 protect sensitive areas,87 and assure that funding of 
state and local infrastructure is consistent with local comprehensive 
plans.s8 The Commission is also required to assess the progress of 
local governments in the implementation of state policy. 89 The Com-
growth policy and its initial membership must include five members recom-
mended by the Maryland Association of Counties, three members recommended 
by the Maryland Municipal League, two planners employed by local jurisdic· 
tions, two citizens from different regions of the state, and one member selected 
by the Commission chair. Id. The Committee on Planning must promote 
education and outreach activities and its initial membership must include a 
Commission member, two members of the local chapters of the American 
Planning Association, two county officials one of whom is an elected official, 
two municipal officials one of whom is elected, and four citizen members 
selected by the Commission chair. [d. The Committee on Planning Techniques 
must develop and promote the use of planning guidelines, models, examples, 
and other planning tools needed to implement the state growth policy and local 
plans and its initial membership must include one Commission member selected 
by the Commission chair, two mem bers selected by the Maryland Association 
of Counties, two members selected by the Maryland Municipal League, three 
members selected by the Director, Office of State Planning, as representative 
of private sector planning community, and two citizen members selected by 
the Commission chair. [d. The Committee on the Environment and Economic 
Development must promote balanced economic growth, effective protection of 
the environment, and cooperation among environmental and development 
interests and its initial membership must include one member of the Commission 
selected by the Commission chair, six members selected by the Governor equally 
representing environmental, business, local governments, and one member 
representing agricultural interests. [d. A fifth Committee on Planning and 
Zoning Review was appointed by the Commission and convened an organiza-
tional meeting on June 2, 1994, to examine the effectiveness of existing enabling 
laws. Chairman Hutchinson Calls Another School Funding Commission Meet-
ing, COURTHOUSE NEWS (Md. Ass'n of Counties, Annapolis, Md.), July 15, 
1994, at 6. 
The specificity of the Planning Act limits discretion in making appoint-
ments to the Commission and its Committees. MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & 
PROC. § 5-707 (Supp. 1994); H.D. 1195, 1992 Sess. § 3 (Md. 1992). The 
Committee membership is heavily weighted in favor of groups that played a 
prominent role in opposing the earlier 2020 Panel proposals, particularly the 
Maryland Association of Counties and the Maryland Municipal League. An-
thony D. Redman, Maryland Growth Management Turnaround, PLANNING, 
June, 1992, at 5. Nevertheless, the Committees are engaged in an ambitious 
work program, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 6-32, and they enjoy wide 
latitude to fashion workable and balanced methods for implementing the state's 
growth policy. MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 5-707(a) (Supp. 1994). 
85. Id. § 5-708(b)(2)(ii). 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. [d. 
89. [d. § 5-708(a)(2). 
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mISSIon has already made significant progress in developing models 
and guidelines for use by local governments and has adopted a 
comprehensive monitoring system with measurement criteria that will 
show whether the state growth' policy is being effectively imple-
mented. 90 
The major weaknesses of the Planning Act involve the absence 
of standards, incentives, direction, enforcement provisions, and a 
dispute resolution process. The application of state policy depends 
entirely upon the cooperation of local governments in applying the 
state growth policy in good faith as part of their local comprehensive 
plans. Yet, there is little in the way of policy direction, standards, 
or incentives to guide local governments as to how the policy is to 
be implemented. For example, the Planning Act does not define 
significant terms such as "rural" or "growth" areas. Each jurisdic-
tion can set its own growth boundaries without any clear differen-
tiation separating growth areas from other areas. Baltimore County 
considers "rural" in terms of a fifty acre minimum density. 91 Charles 
County defines it as three acre density. 92 Washington County defines 
it as one acre density.93 This absence of state-wide standards means 
local governments have little incentive to curb sprawl development 
which is the major objective of state policy. Rather, the perception 
that "more high income residents are economically beneficial" will 
likely perpetuate existing patterns of sprawl development94 unless 
incentives are devised and applied to the implementation process. 
The Planning Act does not provide standards as to how sensitive 
areas are to be defined. With the exception of 100 year floodplains, 
local governments have wide discretion to define sensitive areas 
differently. What is considered a steep slope in Montgomery County 
may not be protected in neighboring Howard County, even though 
the environmental impact of development is the same. 
The Planning Act does not provide incentives for use of newly 
authorized flexible techniques. These techniques would permit the 
location of higher densities and different housing styles in commu-
nities designated as suitable for growth. These flexible techniques 
90. The Commission measures progress based on II categories using a mixture of 
empirical and anecdotal data. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 6-32. A useful 
measurement is reflected in a series of Matrix charts, particularly the Matrix 
on policy and the Matrix on consistency of regulations with policy. [d. at I, 
7. 
91. [d. at 7. 
92. [d. 
93. [d. 
94. The validity of this perception is questioned earlier in this Article, see supra 
note 15. The link between the perception and sprawl is discussed in DEGRovE, 
supra note 9, at 9, 14, 34. 
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would provide a key element for the effective implementation of 
state policy, yet potential community opposition to their use may be 
formidable and local governments are left without incentives or 
guidance as to how and when the techniques should be applied. 95 
The Commission's monitoring responsibilities are made difficult 
by the absence of clear policy direction on how growth and protected 
areas are to be defined. Indeed, the Commission recently acknowl-
edged the need to define roles and responsibilities in order to properly 
implement the Visions of 2020. 96 The Commission cannot monitor 
compliance effectively when the baseline for any measurement of 
compliance is undefined or defined differently by each local govern-
ment who can pay lip service to the state policy by incorporating the 
language of the Visions into their local plans and regulations and 
yet fail to clearly define growth and protected areas. 
Another weakness in the state oversight is the lack of enforce-
ment provisions. Unlike the 2020 Panel proposals, the Planning Act 
provides for only modest sanctions in the event of noncompliance. 97 
State funding or support for state and local projects may be withheld 
if the project is deemed inconsistent with the state growth policy.98 
However, an exemption permits both the state and local governments 
to avoid this sanction for extraordinary circumstances and where no 
reasonable alternative exists. 99 Another sanction permits the Com-
mission to adopt standards under limited circumstances. Failure to 
adopt the sensitive area element of a local comprehensive plan by 
July 1, 1998, will permit the Commission to adopt standards for 
sensitive areas that are binding on local development until such time 
as the local plan is brought into compliance.1°O Because local govern-
ments are given wide discretion to define sensitive areas and establish 
standards for them, it is unlikely that these sanctions will ever be 
levied. 
The Commission is without clear authority to approve local 
plans or programs and, other than for sensitive areas, adopt standards 
with respect to state policy. This lack of enforcement authority may 
undermine policy implementation. For example, protection of farm-
land is a major element of state policy, but implementation of the 
policy is entirely a matter of local discretion both in terms of defining 
95. Developed communities often provide the greatest opposition to new develop-
ment. NAT. COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, H.R. 
Doc. No. 91-34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 111, ch. I, at 206 [hereinafter 
BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY]; Horton. supra note \1, at 24. 
96. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 10. 
97. MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. §§ 5-709, 5-7A-02 (Supp. 1994). 
98. {d. § 5-7A-02. 
99. [d. §§ 5-7A-02(a)(2), (b)(2). 
100. {d. § 5-709. 
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protected areas, and adopting restrictive measures to insure preser-
vation. Under the current framework, local neglect of state policy 
can go unchallenged. The Commission needs authority to act when 
local governments fail to implement state policy. Plan approval and 
rule making authority would rectify situations where local govern-
ments fall short of adequate implementation. WI 
Another necessary enforcement provision involves the right of 
the state to intervene in cases where state policy issues are at stake. 
Intervention is important because of the critical nature of state policy 
and the serious consequences of nonenforcement. These enforcement 
provisions can be effective without ever being invoked. For example, 
designation of appropriate densities to adequately preserve farmland 
may be a difficult task for local governments in the face of local 
opposition. However, the mere possibility of the adoption of stan-
dards by the Commission or state intervention may prompt local 
governments to take serious steps to implement state policy. Th~se 
enforcement provisions would provide the Commission with authority 
similar to that of the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area Commission.102 
The Planning Act fails to provide a dispute resolution process 
for conflicts that will invariably arise. For example, there is no 
process for determining consistency between the state growth policy 
and local plans or regulations, although both the state and local 
governments are required to adopt procedures for review of certain 
affected projects.l03 Presumably, decisions to withhold state funds or 
other support will be based on initial state and local government 
determinations of inconsistency. However, the Planning Act does not 
provide criteria for making this determination or specify a forum 
where disputes involving state and local governments, developers, 
and other groups with legitimate concerns can be resolved. 
Dispute resolution at the administrative level would reduce liti-
gation and promote consistent application of state policy. Moreover, 
an administrative process to resolve disputes seems a better alternative 
,than case by case adjudication by the courts. An administrative 
dispute resolution process should include the authority to establish 
procedural rules governing access and scope of review as well as 
substantive rules governing standards and criteria. The Commission 
is the appropriate forum to hear and decide these disputes because 
it will be developing an expertise pertaining to the state growth 
policy. 
101. Neces~ary elements of a successful state growth management program include 
standards, criteria, and rules. See DEGROVE, supra note 9, at 4, 162-63; 2020 
REPORT, supra note 3, at 16. 
102. See MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. §§ 8-1806, 8-1809 (1990 & Supp. 1994). 
103. MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 5-7A-02(c) (Supp. 1994). 
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The Planning Act establishes a new context for local planning 
and land use regulation and represents a modest first step in providing 
for more state involvement in this process. However, the goals of 
state law far exceed the capacity of the administrative framework 
designed to achieve them and, in this respect, the legislation is 
incomplete. Greater policy direction, standards, incentives, enforce-
ment provisions, and a dispute resolution process are needed to make 
implementation effective. 104 The separate application of state policy 
by each local government without some measure of cohesiveness and 
a single dispute resolution process will undermine the integrity of the 
policy and permit it to become a proverbial Tower of Babel. I05 the 
Commission needs to be provided with the same authority currently 
exercised by the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area Commission. I06 
Notwithstanding the incomplete nature of the legislation, its 
bottom-up approach can be successful if a careful balance is struck 
so that state policy is applied with enough flexibility to accommodate 
local initiatives and regional differences, but with sufficient cohe-
siveness to retain its integrity and not to be sacrificed to either local 
fragmentation or neglect. The challenge for the Commission will be 
to encourage local governments to actually adopt plans and regula-
tions that are truly consistent with the state growth policylO7 and use 
the flexible techniques now authorized to implement that. policy. 108 
III. THE CONSISTENCY REQUIREMENT 
The state growth policy is made mandatory on local governments 
through the consistency requirement which is simply stated but dif-
ficult to apply.I09 Regulatory actions must be consistent with goals 
104. These elements are present in successful state programs and are recommended 
by experts in the field as essential. See DEGROVE, supra note 9, at 10, 109. 
105. See id.; Genesis II :5-9. 
106. See MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. §§ 8-1801,8-1816 (1990 & Supp. 1994); North 
v. St. Mary's County, 99 Md. App. 502, 638 A.2d 1175, cer!. denied, 336 
Md. 224, 647 A.2d 444 (1994) (intervention authority); Bellanca v. County 
Comm'rs of Kent County, 86 Md. App. 219, 586 A.2d 62, cer!. denied, 323 
Md. 33, 591 A.2d 249 (1991) (state plan approval). 
107. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, §§ 3.05(b), 3.06(b), 4.09 (Supp. 1994). 
108. MD .. ANN. CODE art. 66B, §§ 10.01, 11.01, 12.01 (Supp. 1994). 
109. The Commission summarized the problem nicely: 
Attention to consistency arises from the fact that while no plan in 
Maryland has ever advocated sprawl, this has been the result where 
there is no strong connection between land use planning and land use 
regulation. Well-drafted goals and policies have no meaning if they 
are not supported by equally well-drafted zoning ordinances and 
subdivision regulations. A working definition of consistency is difficult 
to achieve, however. A literal translation of plan to regulation might 
produce a situation where planners perform a function that is legis-
1994] Mary/and's Growth Policy 477 
and policies contained in the comprehensive plan. The problem lies 
in the varied nature of comprehensive planning. Some plans contain 
site specific recommendations, while others contain general recom-
mendations with little concrete application to particular regulatory 
actions. Moreover, planning and regulation serve different functions, 
and the replication of the plan in regulation simply creates duplication 
in process. A delicate balance is needed between the two functions 
in order to maintain the integrity of one without replacement of the 
other. 
The planning process provides a sound basis for regulatory 
action. Planning decisions are reached after careful study and public 
debate on a range of issues affecting comprehensive areas. 11O These 
planning decisions, which possess a degree of rationality generally 
absent from ad hoc regulatory decisions, III are incorporated into a 
comprehensive plan, master plan, or general plan. 1I2 Under the con-
sistency requirement, these plans serve as the basis for subsequent 
regulatory decisions. 113 The consistency requirement promotes the 
goals of comprehensive planning and links planning and development 
regulations so these regulations, and decisions made pursuant to 
them, are evaluated against a planning baseline."4 
The consistency requirement is not new and was explained in 
Fasano v. Board of Commissioners,"5 a famous Oregon case which 
held that zoning decisions must ·be consistent with land use and 
density elements of the comprehensive plan. 1I6 Since Oregon has used 
the consistency requirement longer than any other jurisdiction, its 
case law provides some useful insights into how consistency is applied. 
A consistency determination involves all elements of a comprehensive 
plan.1I7 For example, a zoning request that was not consistent with 
the plan's staging element was found to lack consistency."8 In another 
lative in nature, or a situation where both documents are so similar 
it is not necessary to have both. 
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 15. The Subcommittee on Planning Tech-
niques is drafting an "operational" definition of consistency. [d. 
110. See generally Mraz v. Comm'rs of Cecil County, 291 Md. 81, 433 A.2d 771 
(1981). 
Ill. See DEGRovE, supra note 9, at 15,21. 
112. The terms "comprehensive plan," "master plan," and "general plan" are 
interchangeable. MD. ANN. CODE art. 668, § l.OO(f)(2) (Supp. 1994). 
113. MD. ANN. CODE art. 668, § 4.09 (Supp. 1994). 
114. 1 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR., RATHKOPF's THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 
§ 12.04[2) (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter RATHKOPF); see DEGROVE, supra note 9, 
at IS, 21. 
115.507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973). 
116. [d. at 29-30. 
117. [d. at 28. 
118. Philipi v. City of Sublimity, 662 P.2d 325, 329 (Or. 1983). 
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case, a zoning request for greater intensity of use than contemplated 
by the plan was found to be inconsistent with the plan. 119 
The consistency requirement as applied to zoning regulations will 
present a major surprise for many because of the long-standing 
Maryland common-law rule that master plans are only guides and 
cannot form the basis for zoning decisions. 120 This common-law rule, 
of course, only applies in the absence of statute l21 and the courts 
have recognized that local efforts to link planning and zoning actions 
by statute are appropriate and elevate the status of comprehensive 
plans to a regulatory device. 122 
Consistency was applied in Maryland in several cases. In County 
Commissioners v. Gaster,123 consistency between the master plan and 
subdivision approval was required by statute. 124 A denial of a sub-
119. Gillis v. City of Springfield, 611 P .2d 355, 356-57 (Or. Ct. App. 1980). 
120. See STANLEY D. ABRAMS, GUIDE TO MARYLAND ZONING DECISIONS § 5.2 (3d 
ed. 1992). The common-law rule is not unique to Maryland and developed at 
a time when local governments struggled with the implementation of their 
newly delegated land use authority. See generally Charles M. Haar, In Accor-
dance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154 (1955). The term 
"comprehensive plan" has been a part of zoning enabling laws since the 1920s. 
Id. at 1154. The plan was intended to provide a link between planning and 
zoning actions and the enabling laws provided that zoning be "in accord with 
the comprehensive plan." Id. When zoning was first applied at the local level, 
however, many jurisdictions neglected to adopt comprehensive plans as the 
term is now understood and this omission caused problems for reviewing courts 
when the zoning was challenged. Id. 
At one time, the term "comprehensive plan" was undefined which allowed 
judges to define the plan as something other than a physical document. Hence, 
some courts defined the "comprehensive plan" as the cumulative product of 
corriprehensive zoning regulations, administrative practice, and local custom. 
See Nottingham Village, Inc. v. Baltimore County, 266 Md. 339, 292 A.2d 
680 (1972); Huff v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Baltimore County, 214 Md .. 
48, 133 A.2d 83 (1957); Udall v. Haas, 235 N.E.2d 897 (N.Y. 1968). On this 
basis the comprehensive plan was defined as something different than a master 
plan. The result of these decisions rendered master plans mere guides that were 
not to playa significant role in the regulatory process. Kanfer v. Montgomery 
County Council, 35 Md .. App. 715, 373 A.2d 5 (1977). Since comprehensive 
plans are now defined by law to include master plans and general plans, MD. 
ANN. CODE art.' 66B, § 1.00 (Supp. 1994), it is unlikely that the common-law 
rule will hinder the implementation of the consistency requirement of the 
Planning Act. 
121. Boyds Civic Ass'n v. Montgomery County Council, 309 Md. 683, 702-04, 526 
A.2d 598, 608-09 (1987); Floyd v. Council of Prince George's County, 55 Md. 
App. 246, 258-59, 461 A.2d 76, 83 (1983). 
122. Boyds Civic Ass'n, 309 Md. at 702-04, 526 A.2d at 608-09; Floyd, 55 Md. 
App. at 258-59, 461 A.2d at 83. 
123. 285 Md. 233,401 A.2d 666 (1979). 
124. Id. at 242, 401 A.2d at 670. 
1994] Maryland's Growth Policy 479 
division approval based on a finding of inconsistency with the plan 
was upheld despite conformity with the applicable zoning. 125 The 
master plan contained a staging element that limited density to· 
adequate roads and the development was denied on that basis.126 The 
Gaster decision was followed in Coffey v. Maryland-National Capital 
Park & Planning Commission. 127 Several local governments have 
linked planning and zoning by a statutory consistency requirement l28 
and the validity of this approach was acknowledged in Boyds Civic 
Association v. Montgomery County Council.129 
The Commission identified several factors for use in evaluating 
consistency with the state growth policy: (1) creating opportunities 
for concentrated development in suitable plan-designated areas; (2) 
achieving regulatory streamlining to encourage development and ec-
onomic growth in plan-designated areas; (3) implementing protection 
for agricultural land and other rural resource areas; and (4) requiring 
that sensitive areas be adequately delineated in the plan or mapped 
by an applicant. 130 The Commission's actual evaluations, however, 
appear nonsubstantive in nature and may permit consistency deter-
minations where local jurisdictions simply articulate the state policy 
without meaningful regulations to implement it. For example, rural 
zoning categories in several counties are listed by the Commission as 
apparently consistent with state policy when they reflect density levels 
that encourage the continuation of sprawl development and do not 
preserve agricultural land. 131 
Consistency is critical to the success of the state policy and 
disputes will invariably arise as to its implementation. For example, 
any authorization for development within an area in need of protec-
tion is likely to prompt a challenge based on consistency. Local 
regulatory decisions may raise questions of consistency with state 
policy and policies adopted by neighboring jurisdictions. 132 Municipal 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 240-41, 401 A.2d at 669-70. 
127. 293 Md. 24, 25-26, 441 A.2d 1041, 1041-42 (1982). 
128. For example, Montgomery and Prince George's Counties established several 
zoning districts that require consistency with the master plan. See MONTGOMERY 
COUNTY ZONING ORDINANCE §§ 59-C-6.214, 59-C-8.24, 59-C-12.2, 59-C-18.3 
(Jan. 1993); Floyd v. Council of Prince George's County, 55 Md. App. 246, 
461 A.2d 76 (1983). 
129. 309 Md. 683, 526 A.2d 675 (1989). 
130. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 16. 
131. Id. at 7. 
132. Developments with regional impact need to be evaluated on a comprehensive 
basis. The potential environmental impact of the Washington Redskins profes-
sional football stadium proposed to be located near the juncture of three 
counties has prompted local governments and environmental groups to complain 
about the lack of a regional dispute resolution forum. Dan Beyers, Two 
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annexation of land within a county's protected areas can also raise 
questions of consistency with both local plans and state policy. m 
There is a need to provide a mechanism to resolve these potential 
disputes. 134 The absence of a dispute resolution process means that 
local governments will make the initial determination themselves and, 
if disputes arise, the courts will decide whether local plans, regula-
tions, or decisions are consistent with the state growth policy or with 
each other. It remains to be seen how the consistency requirement 
will be applied, but the current law encourages both lawyer ingenuity 
and litigation. 135 
Leading Environmental Groups Formally Oppose Laurel Stadium Plan, WASH. 
POST, July 14, 1994, at B3. After a record 27 days of public hearings reflecting 
significant controversy, local land use approval of the proposed development 
will be made under Anne Arundel County's special exception process. Dan 
Beyers, Stadium Middleman Keeping His Balance, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 1994, 
at B6. 
133. For example, Poolesville, a Montgomery County municipality which possesses 
its own planning and zoning powers, is considering annexation of a large tract 
currently designated as part of the county's agricultural preserve for use as a 
large school and religious complex sponsored by the Saudi Arabian government. 
The project which was described by county officials as a mega city is considered 
inconsistent with county planning objectives. Louis Aquilar, Potter Joins 
Opposition to Saudi Project in Poolesville, WASH. POST, Sept. I, 1994, at Md. 
I. In recognition of the annexation problem, the Commission recommended 
that it undertake a study of annexation laws and policies with the objective to 
better define long-term growth boundaries. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 
4. 
134. The Planning Act requires procedures to be adopted for determining consistency 
with respect to state funding and support sanctions, but these procedures will 
necessarily be narrow in scope applying only to certain projects and will not 
address local plans or land use regulations. MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & 
PROC. § 5-7A-02(c) (Supp. 1994). The Planning Act also requires state agencies 
to coordinate their actions and policies so they are consistent with the state 
growth policy and local plans. [d. § 5-7 A-02. The Planning Act requires state 
government projects and funding to conform with the planning initiatives. ld. 
State actions, for the first time, must be consistent with not only the state 
growth policy but also with local plans which apply that policy. [d. State 
procedures were adopted to review capital projects for consistency. ANNUAL 
REPORT, supra note 5, at 30. This aspect of the Planning Act is significant 
because growth policies adopted by other states have been undermined by the 
failure to include state agencies and their projects in the policy implementation. 
See DEGRovE, supra note 9, at 26-27. 
135. Judicial resolution of consistency disputes raises questions about standing. A 
developer denied permission to build may challenge a consistency determination. 
A local government denied state funding may also challenge a consistency 
determination. However, environmental or civic groups may not enjoy equal 
rights to question local consistency determinations because of common-law 
standing restrictions. See Medical Waste Assocs. v. Maryland Waste Coalition, 
327 Md. 596, 612-14, 612 A.2d 241, 245-50 (1992). Neighboring jurisdictions 
also need access to a forum to argue their disagreements with local plans, as 
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The task of evaluating local plans or regulations for their con-
sistency with the state policy and with each other may overwhelm an 
overworked judicial system in view of the wide variation among local 
comprehensive plans, regulations, and decisions that will be produced 
under the current framework. A judicial determination of noncom-
pliance with the consistency requirement may cause invalidation of 
a whole planning and zoning scheme. Given the importance of 
consistency in the implementation of the state policy, invalidation 
may be a necessary remedy in certain circumstances.'36 However, the 
sanction raises questions about interim regulations which will govern 
in the absence of invalidated regulations. Will the Commission be 
permitted to adopt interim regulations as it is authorized to do in 
the case of sensitive area matters?137 Will the courts require other 
interim relief; and, if so, what relief? These questions underscore the 
incomplete nature of the legislation and provide another justification 
for a dispute resolution mechanism. 
The manner in which the consistency requirement is applied will 
determine the credibility of the current legislative approachYs If local 
comprehensive plans are truly consistent with the state policy and 
this consistency is enforced through adoption of land use regulations 
and development approvals, then major strides in the implementation 
of state policy will be achieved. If, however, local governments are 
allowed to conduct business as usual, then state policy will lose 
credibility and the environment will continue to suffer the conse-
quences. 
IV. FLEXIBLE TECHNIQUES 
The Planning Act encourages use of innovative and flexible 
techniques by local governments for implementation of the state 
growth policy. 139 Local governments are authorized to employ a 
variety of flexible techniques for managing growth under several 
illustrated by a recent conflict about potential development in Howard County 
and objections by neighboring Montgomery and Prince George's Counties. 
Dan Beyers, Howard's Development Aspirations Fracture Tri-County Cordial-
ity, WASH. POST, March 30, 1993, at B I. I f appeals can only be made by those 
regulated and not the beneficiaries of the regulation, the state policy will be 
frustrated. Fairness supports wide access to a comprehensive dispute resolution 
forum on the question of consistency. 
136. Invalidation may be applied as a remedy where local action departs from 
established norms. City of Miami v. Save Bricknell Ave., Inc., 426 So. 2d 
1100, 1102 (Fla. App. 1983). 
137. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 5-709 (Supp. 1994). 
138. Effective state oversight requires empowerment to resolve the inevitable conflicts 
that will arise over interpretation of state policy. DEGRoVE, supra note 9, at 
162-63. . 
139. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 3.05(a)(l)(vi) (Supp. 1994). 
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provisions of state lawl40 and these techniques have been applied with 
some success by local governments in Maryland and elsewhere. 141 
The core of the state growth policy can be distilled into four 
regulatory objectives: (1) growth concentrated in suitable areas under 
streamlined procedures; 142 (2) provision for affordable housing; 143 (3) 
resource conservation 144 and protection of sensitive areas; 145 and (4) 
funding mechanisms that achieve the other strategic policies. 146 This 
Part of this Article analyzes how flexible techniques may be used 
either individually or in combination for the implementation of these 
four objectives. Of course, individual techniques may be applied to 
several objectives and this analysis does not suggest that the tech-
niques can only be applied as discussed. 
A. Growth Concentrated in Suitable Areas Under Streamlined 
Procedures 
The principal regulatory technique for directing growth to desired 
locations is zoning because it determines land use, density, and 
location. Zoning can be either a streamlined device or an obstacle 
to growth.l 47 
1. Types of Zoning Available in Maryland 
Traditional Euclidean zoning is the most prevalent form of 
zoning,148 and it constitutes the biggest obstacle for implementation 
of state policy. Euclidean zoning is designed as a rigid, self-executing 
regulation, that requires minimum government oversight once imple-
mented. 149 Design standards are applied in an inflexible manner, 150 
except for a cumbersome and sometimes strict variance process that 
140. [d. §§ 10.01, 11.01, 12.01 (1988 & Supp. 1994). 
141. See Carol M. Dickey, History of Staging in Montgomery County, 1993 J. OF 
MD. PLANNING, at 1-6; DEGRovE, supra note 9, at 90; RATHKOPF, supra note 
114, §§ 9.01-9.02, 9.04. 
142. MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 5-7A-0I(l) (Supp. 1994); MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 66B, § 3.05(a)(I)(vi) (Supp. 1994). 
143. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, §§ 10.01, 12.Q1 (Supp. 1994). 
144. MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 5-7A-01(5) (Supp. 1994). 
145. [d. § 5-7A-01(2). 
·146. [d. § 5-7A-01(7). 
147. Zoning has historically manifested both results. Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Shaping 
Megalopolis: The Transformation of Euclidean Zoning by Special Zoning 
Districts and Site Specific Development Review Techniques, 1993 ZONING AND 
PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK, at 65-79; BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, supra 
note 95, at 203-08. 
148. Euclidean zoning derives its name from the basic zoning ordinance upheld in 
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
149. BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, supra note 95, at 203-04. 
150. [d. 
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may provide a waiver in cases of hardship or practica1 difficulty. 151 
In practice, Euclidean zoning is not conducive to either concentration 
of growth or streamlined regulation. It has been historically applied 
with a "wait and see" attitude to zone large areas for low densities 
that are suitable for higher density development, allowing local 
officials to negotiate higher densities as development proposals ma-
terialize. ls2 Paradoxically, it has also been applied in a lax manner 
to zone areas for residential use that should be protected because of 
their rural or sensitive nature, but become ripe for development 
before local government can act to adopt protective measures. 153 Once 
applied, revisions are difficult, expensive, and time consuming. 154 
151. North v. St. Mary's County, 99 Md. App. 502, 511, 638 A.2d 1175, 1179 
(1994). The late Judge Rita C. Davidson provided a thorough explanation of 
the variance process as applied in Maryland in Anderson v. Board of Appeals, 
22 Md. App. 28, 39, 322 A.2d 220, 226-27 (1974). 
152. Kaplan, supra note 17, at 26-31; BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, supra note 
95, at 206. 
153. 2020 REPORT, supra note 3, at 18-19; BAY REPORT, supra note 1, at 7; Horton, 
supra note 11, at 25; ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 15. 
154. Euclidean rezoning is very difficult to change. In Maryland, Euclidean zoning 
amendments are subject to the change-mistake rule which requires a strict 
standard of proof. See ABRAMS, supra note 120, § 1.3. Maryland's change-
mistake rule is a judicially created doctrine that supposedly has its roots in 
Northwest Merchant Terminal, Inc. v. O'Rourke, 191 Md. 171, 60 A.2d 743 
(1948). The essential elements are simply stated: "Where a property is rezoned, 
it must appear that either there was some mistake in the original (or subsequent 
comprehensive) zoning, or the character of the neighborhood has changed to 
such an extent that such action ought to be taken." Kracke v. Weinberg, 197 
Md. 339, 347, 79 A.2d 387,391 (1951). 
The purpose of the change-mistake rule is to provide a baseline measure-
ment to evaluate the continuing validity of a presumption accorded the last 
comprehensive zoning. Comprehensive zoning is by definition the product of 
a well thought out, carefully planned zoning action that considers a number 
of policies, premises, assumptions, and trends, and it is normally accorded a 
presumption of validity as a safeguard against later attempts to rezone indi-
vidual parcels in a haphazard manner that threatens the underlying public 
policies of the comprehensive zoning. Mraz v. Board of County Comm'rs, 291 
Md. 81, 88-89, 433 A.2d 771, 776 (1981); see Norbeck Village Joint Venture 
v. Montgomery County Council, 254 Md. 59, 66, 254 A.2d 700, 705 (1969). 
If the presumption is overcome, then individual rezoning is deemed permissible. 
Howard County v. Dorsey, 292 Md. 351, 355, 438 A.2d 1339, 1342 (1982). 
The change-mistake rule applies to piecemeal Euclidean rezoning, see 
Mayor of Baltimore v. NAACP, 221 Md. 329, 334, 157 A.2d 433, 436 (1960), 
and does not apply to comprehensive zoning, McBee v. Baltimore County, 221 
Md. 312, 317, 157 A.2d 258, 260 (1960), or to floating zones, Huff v. Board 
of Zoning Appeals of Baltimore County, 214 Md. 48, 61, 133 A.2d 83, 91 
(1957). Defining the circumstances that satisfy the rule can cause considerable 
delay and expense because of the complex factual and legal issues concerning 
what constitutes change, mistake, or the neighborhood. See generally ABRAMS, 
supra note 120, ch. 1. The rule has been widely criticized as overly restrictive 
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Euclidean zoning is responsible for most of the sprawl development 
against which the Visions of 2020 are directed. 155 
The floating zone, by contrast, provides an important tool for 
application of flexible techniques because its provisions can be tai-
lored to site specific land uses, as well as performance and design 
objectives. 156 It forms the host for a variety of flexible zoning 
districts. 157 Moreover, it can be applied more quickly and easier than 
Euclidean zoning and therefore responds better to market forces and 
provides for more streamlined regulation. 158 For these very reasons, 
and inflexible. See I NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR., AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW 
§ 32.01 (1988). 
The rigid nature of the Euclidean zoning means that the use of flexible 
zoning techniques are largely confined to floating zones or comprehensive 
:loning. Yet, floating zones are disfavored in some jurisdictions because of 
hostility from the community about their sudden application. Comprehensive 
zoning does not permit a site specific analysis that is inherent in the use of 
flexible zoning. Because of these limitations, a broader baseline should be 
applied for more flexible use of Euclidean zoning. The change-mistake rule 
need not be abandoned. It has served the state well. What is proposed, however, 
is that the enabling law be amended to permit rezoning to be granted on the 
basis of other factors in addition to change-mistake. See Fasano v. Board of 
County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23, 28-29 (Or. 1979), overruled on other grounds 
by 607 P.2d 725 (Or. 1980). 
155. BAY REPORT, supra note I, at 7; ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 15. 
156. The floating zone derives its name from its unanchored characteristic that 
permits it to float over an entire legislative district and descend at any location 
that satisfies predetermined standards. See generally Huff v. Board of Zoning 
Appeals, 214 Md. 48, 133 A.2d 8 (1957). The "floating zone" is now authorized 
for use by all jurisdictions in Maryland with planning and zoning authority. 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 1O.01(a)(8) (Supp. 1994). The annotation for this 
section provides a useful working definition of the term floating zone. The 
authorization of floating zones for all jurisdictions with planning and zoning 
authority is important because it corrects an inconsistency among the various 
jurisdictions and promotes the use of site specific flexible zoning techniques. 
Nevertheless, further clarification is necessary. Noncharter counties and mu-
nicipalities are governed by the enabling authority found in Article 66B, MD. 
ANN. CODE art. 668, § 4.05(a) (1988 & Supp. 1994), that requires findings of 
fact relating to change and mistake that are inappropriate for floating zones. 
See Aubinoe v. Lewis, 250 Md. 645, 653, 244 A.2d 879, 883-84 (1968). 
157. Flexibility in application, as compared to the rigidity of the Euclidean zones, 
is a major advantage for the floating zone. Ziegler, supra note 147. The 
floating zone has been compared to a special exception that can be applied at 
any location within a specified zoning district that satisfies predetermined 
legislative standards. Compare Bigenho v. Montgomery County Council, 248 
Md. 386, 390-91, 237 A.2d 53, 56 (1968) with Schultz v. Pritts, 291 Md. I, 
11,432 A.2d 1319,1325 (1981). The analogy stops at this point because the 
floating zone is applied over a wider area and involves legislative discretion 
rather than a purely administrative action. Rockville Crushed Stone, Inc. v. 
Montgomery County, 78 Md. App. 176, 183, 552 A.2d 960, 963 (1989). 
158. The change-mistake rule does not apply to floating zones, Aubinoe v. Lewis, 
250 Md. 645, 652, 244 A.2d 879, 883 (1968), so the zoning can be applied 
quickly if the location meets the eligibility requirements. 
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however, the floating zone is viewed with suspicion by community 
groups and political pressure often discourages its use. 159 The rigid 
nature of the Euclidean zone presents few surprises for the com-
munity, but the floating zone can be applied suddenly and without 
warning. 160 The flexibility of the floating zone is achieved at the 
expense of predictability. It is necessary, therefore, to use floating 
zones with adequate safeguards to insure both compatibility and 
predictability. 161 
A hybrid or special purpose zoning device combines the certainty 
of Euclidean zoning with the flexibility of the floating zone. This 
hybrid zoning device was approved in Maryland in Montgomery 
County V. Woodward & Lothrop,162 and provides for both standard 
and optional methods of development within a base Euclidean zone. 163 
The optional method usually includes incentives, such as higher 
densities and preferred uses, to encourage its application,164 but also 
requires more government oversight through a site plan review process 
to ensure compatibility and necessary amenities. 165 This hybrid zoning 
involves a delegation of authority to an administrative agency that 
approves site plans under pre-set legislative standards.'66 The zoning 
authority has less control under this hybrid than it does under the 
floating zone,167 but the hybrid offers the community more predict-
ability. 168 
159. See supra note II. The community opposition to more density is characterized 
as NIMBYism or "not in my back yard." Wasserman, supra note 49, at 13. 
The purpose of zoning at the community level is to protect established neigh-
borhoods from the intrusion of incompatible uses. Much local zoning is 
intended more to prevent change than to guide it. BUILDING THE AMERICAN 
CITY, supra note 95, at 204. 
160. The floating zoning cannot be applied without satisfying procedural notice 
requirements. However, it can be applied without the delays and expense 
associated with the Euclidean zone. See supra note 154. 
161. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
162. 280 Md. 686, 725, 376 A.2d 483, 504 (1977). 
163. See, e.g., MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., ZONING ORDINANCE § 59-C-6.215 (1994). 
164. [d. 
165. Ziegler, supra note 147. 
166. [d. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., ZONING ORDINANCE § 59-D-2.0 (1994). 
167. The zoning authority exercises legislative discretion when considering the ap-
plication of a floating zone, but the discretion is diminished when an admin-
istrative agency is delegated the decision making role under pre-set standards. 
Compare Rockville Crushed Stone, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 78 Md. App. 
176, 193-94, 552 A.2d 960, 968 (1989) with Schultz v. Pritts, 291 Md. 1,21, 
432 A.2d 1319, 1330 (1981). 
168. The Euclidean base zone will normally be applied by comprehensive zoning. 
See Montgomery County v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 280 Md. 686, 376 
A.2d 483 (1977). 
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Another hybrid device is the overlay zoning district, which, as 
its name implies, involves the application of a second layer of zoning 
to achieve a specific purpose without replacing the base zone. 169 This 
hybrid zoning was approved in Maryland in Swarthmore Co. v. 
Kaestner,170 and may be more restrictive than the base zoning for 
environmental protection purposes in areas where base zoning is 
already applied, but does not contain adequate safeguards to protect 
the environment. 171 The overlay zone can also be used to achieve 
flexibility in the authorization of development that could not occur 
under the base zoning. For example, Montgomery County adopted 
an overlay zoning district to maintain the scale and character of the 
Wheaton Central Business District, and yet permit a range of retail, 
cultural, entertainment, and recreational uses not permitted under 
the base zoning.172 
Both the floating zone and the hybrids can serve as hosts for 
the various flexible techniques now authorized for local governments. 
These zoning tools are used to concentrate growth in suitable loca-
tions under a streamlined regulatory process. 
2. Use of Flexible Techniques 
Flexible zoning techniques can accommodate immediate devel-
opment or growth staged over time and provide for a varied mix of 
housing types and densities, more efficient use of land, environmen-
tally sensitive development, more open space, and a range of com-
munity amenities.173 Several flexible zoning techniques, including the 
following, can be used in combination to promote these objectives: 
the cluster method of development,174 mixed use development, 175 
169. RATHKOPF, supra note 114, § 1.04(2)[L]. 
170. 258 Md. 517, 266 A.2d 341 (1970). 
171. RATHKOPF, supra note 114, § 7.03[3]; Ziegler, supra note 147. 
172. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., ZONING ORDINANCE § 59-C-18 (1994). 
173. See Estate of Friedman v. Pierce County, 768 P.2d 462, 469 (Wash. 1989); 
Orinda Homeowners Comm. v. Board of Supervisors, 90 Cal. Rptr. 88, 90 
(1970). 
174. Cluster development authorizes variations in the manner of development in 
order to preserve open spaces and environmentally sensitive areas. See Estate 
of Friedman v. Pierce County, 768 P.2d 462 (Wash. 1989). Cluster development 
is often permitted as an alternative form of development at the subdivision 
stage or as a flexible zoning device. The annotation to subsection 10.0\ (a)(5) 
of Article 66B, MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 1O.01(a)(5) (Supp. 1994), provides 
a useful working definition of this term. 
175. Mixed use development allows for a combination of uses within the same 
zoning district. See Montgomery County v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 280 
Md. 686, 694-95, 376 A.2d 483, 488 (1977). Because zoning was originally 
justified on the basis that separation of uses accomplished important public 
purposes, see Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 391 
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planned unit development (PUD),176 performance zoning,l77 and in-
centive zoning. 178 
The discretion associated with flexible zoning demands govern-
ment oversight throughout the development process because the greater 
(1926), care must be taken to ensure that this zoning device maintains necessary 
elements of compatibility in its application so that the mixed uses are not 
vulnerable to a charge of arbitrary classifications. See Goldman v. Crowther, 
147 Md. 282, 128 A. 50 (1925). This device is always dependent on a site 
specific plan because the specific mix of uses must be authorized by the zoning 
authority or under delegated standards to an administrative agency. If the mix 
of uses is approved at the zoning stage, it is usually applied as piecemeal 
rezoning to allow for a site specific evaluation. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 668, 
§ 1O.01(a)(4) (Supp. 1994) (annotation providing working definition of "mixed 
use development"). 
176. The PUD is another site specific zoning device that can include both cluster 
and mixed use development. See Estate of Friedman v. Pierce County, 768 
P.2d 462, 469 (Wash. 1989). It is often established as a floating zone, the 
location of which is evaluated under pre-set legislative standards and a site 
specific development plan approved at the time of zoning. Although PUDs 
have been widely used in Maryland, review by the courts has been limited. See 
Coscan Washington, Inc. v. Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning 
Comm'n, 87 Md. App. 602, 590 A.2d 1080 (1991), cert. denied 324 Md. 324, 
597 A.2d 421 (1991); Rockville Crushed Stone, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 
78 Md. App. 176, 552 A.2d 960 (1989); Montgomery County v. Greater 
Colesville Citizens Ass'n, 70 Md. App. 374, 521 A.2d 770 (1987); see also 
Floyd v. County Council, 55 Md. App. 246, 461 A.2d 76 (1983); Howard 
Research & Dev. Corp. v. Howard County, 46 Md. App. 498, 418 A.2d 1253 
(1980). See MD. ANN. CODE art. 668, § 1O.01(a)(6) (Supp. 1994) (annotation 
providing working definition of "planned unit development"). 
177. Performance zoning relies more on performance standards than the more 
traditional design standards. The zoning can be used to measure external 
impacts for environmental protection and other purposes. See RATHKOPF, supra 
note 114, § 1.04[2][m]. For example, Columbia's New Town Zoning District 
requires development to provide certain levels of green space and density but 
within these limitations, the developer retains flexibility over design and bulk 
issues. HOWARD COUNTY, MD., ZONING REGULATIONS § 122A (1985); see MD. 
ANN. CODE art. 668, § 1O.01(a)(IO) (Supp. 1994) (annotation providing working 
definition of "performance zoning"). 
178. Incentive zoning provides inducements, usually in the form of higher densities, 
in exchange for public facilities or amenities ranging from public space to 
affordable housing. RATHKOPF, supra note 114, § 1.04[2Hi]. Incentive zoning 
is a sophisticated level of regulation that includes several levels of government 
oversight to insure that the incentives are property implemented in a manner 
that achieves the objectives of the zoning. See generally Jerold S. Kayden, 
Zoning jor Dollars: New Rules jar an Old Game? Comments on the Municipal 
Art Society and Nollan Cases, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3 (1991). 
A site specific plan is reviewed and approved either at the zoning stage, the 
subdivision or permit stage, or both. The zoning can be designed on two levels 
to include the incentive and a base zone that allows development as of right 
without the incentive. [d.; see MD. ANN. CODE art. 668, § 1O.01(a)(9) (Supp. 
1994) (annotation providing working definition of "incentive zoning"). 
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flexibility and discretion of the process means greater potential for 
abuse. 179 Government oversight must ensure procedural fairness and 
prevent abuse of discretion. 180 Safeguards include pre-set design 181 or 
performance standards,182 development plan 183 or site plan reviews,184 
master plan conformity, 185 amendment procedures,186 provisions for 
179. Kayden, supra note 178, at 6-7; RATHKOPF, supra note 114, § 41.06. 
180. See generally 3 RATHKOPF, supra note 114, § 41.06. 
181. Pre-set standards can include minimum and maximum levels of development. 
An approved development may exceed threshold standards in order to justify 
the zoning at a particular location. For example, a proposal may include 451170 
open space even though the minimum standard is only 30%. The additional 
open space may be necessary to achieve desired clustering or environmental 
objectives. These pre-set standards are necessary to ensure that development 
does not violate traditional prohibitions against conditional zoning. See Mont-
gomery County v. Greater Colesville Citizens Ass'n, Inc., 70 Md. App. 374, 
385, 521 A.2d 770, 776 (1987); cf. Rodriguez v. Prince George's County, 79 
Md. App. 537, 551-52, 558 A.2d 742, 749 (1989). 
182. RATHKOPF, supra note 114, § 1.04[2][m]. For example, minimum noise levels 
may be required for industrial uses. See MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., ZONING 
ORDINANCE § 59-C-12 (1993). 
183. A development plan is approved at the time of zoning and, in the absence of 
pre-set standards, provides the key limitation under the flexible zoning technique 
because it contains authorization for specific land uses, densities, and bulk 
specifications such as setbacks and building heights. 2 ROBERT M. ANDERSON, 
AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 11.12 (3d ed., 1986 & Supp. 1992); Millbrae 
Ass'n for Residential Survival v. City of Millbrae, 69 Cal. Rptr. 251 (1968). 
The plan includes the zoning specifications as applied to the site. [d. All parcels 
included under a development plan are subject to it despite a subsequent 
conveyance. The conveyed parcel is not severed from the development plan 
unless the plan is specifically amended. Estate of Friedman, 768 P.2d at 469. 
184. Site plan review provides for post-zoning oversight to ensure conformity with 
pre-set standards or a development plan. Millbrae Ass'n, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 264-
65. Site plan review is limited in scope under delegated administrative authority. 
S.E.W. Friel v. Triangle Oil Co., 76 Md. App. 96, 109, 543 A.2d 863, 869 
(1988). It is not intended as a substitute for zoning. [d. at 106, 543 A.2d at 
868. Consequently, a planning board lacks authority to approve a site plan 
that purports to change land uses, density, development standards, or staging 
of development. Hansel v. City of Keene, 634 A.2d 1351, 1353 (N.H. 1993). 
185. Master plan conformity plays a growing role in the use of flexible zoning. See 
supra Part III. The' master plan is used to set limits on density, provide 
development guidelines for certain locations, specify land uses or environmental 
requirements, provide for staging of development until public facilities are 
adequate, and specify the need for public facilities or amenities such as local 
parks or open space. See generally supra Part lIl. 
186. Amendment procedures provide opportunity for changes to be considered. Not 
every change to an approved flexible zoning project requires a hearing. See 
generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (discussing due process 
requirements); Cloutier v. Town of Epping, 714 F.2d 1184, 1191 (1st Cir. 
1983); Chevy Chase Village v. Montgomery County Bd. of Appeals, 249 Md. 
334, 345-46, 339 A.2d 740, 745 (1968). There is a need to structure the 
amendment process so that it achieves both streamlined objectives and fairness 
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perpetual maintenance of common areas,187 and development agree-
ments for public facilities or amenities. 188 Each of these measures 
plays an important role in ensuring that flexible zoning is properly 
applied and implemented in an integrated and consistent manner. 
Safeguards are also necessary to assuage community hostility to 
flexible zoning. 
Design flexibility is a prominent characteristic of this type of 
zoning. 189 Instead of rigid standards characteristic of traditional Eu-
clidean zoning,l90 flexible zoning permits unique forms of develop-
ment tailored to site specific situations. 191 The site specific evaluation 
promotes better development because land uses, design, and location 
can be evaluated under a discretionary process that allows flexibility 
for the developer in exchange for more detailed regulation. 192 
An example of the flexible zoning process can be found in the 
Town of Columbia, Maryland, that was developed under techniques 
to the participants. 
An obvious demarcation in the formality of the process would involve 
changes that affect approved density, land use, or bulk specifications such as 
building height. These elements are a basic part of zoning regulation and 
changes of this nature should involve a process similar to the original zoning 
approval. See Millbrae Ass'n, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 264-66. 
187. Creation of common areas used for open space, green area, or recreational 
purposes is one of the beneficial aspects of the clustering technique. However, 
there is a need to protect the land held in trust for these purposes to assure 
that it is perpetually maintained. Once zoning is approved, it is the responsibility 
of the owner as trustee for the land to be held in common to provide for the 
necessary mechanisms for maintenance and conveyance to the ultimate user 
organization, whether a homeowners association, park and recreation associa-
. tion, or condominium association. The zoning and site plan stages are used to 
review the adequacy of these mechanisms. See, e.g., MONTGOMERY COUNTY, 
MD., ZONING ORDINANCE § 59-0-1.3 (1994). 
188. A development agreement can be an integral part of the flexible zoning process 
to provide necessary infrastructure or other amenities and, in exchange, the 
developer is provided with some certainty that the regulations will not be 
changed while the project is built out. John J. Delaney, Development Agree-
ments: The Road from Prohibition to "Let's Make a Deal!", 25 URB. LAW. 
49, 49-50 (1993). In effect the development agreement provides for protection 
against harsh effect of the vested rights doctrine and promotes financing of 
infrastructure for large projects. Id.; see generally Patricia G. Hammes, De-
velopment Agreements: The Intersection of Real Estate Finance and Land Use 
Controls, 23 U. BALT. L. REV. 119 (1993). 
189. See Estate of Friedman, 768 P.2d at 469. 
190. {d. 
191. {d. 
192. The flexibility inherent in the zoning does not violate principles of uniformity. 
Ziegler, supra note 147; see Prince George's County v. M & B Construction 
Corp., 267 Md. 338, 363, 297 A.2d 683, 695 (1972); Orinda Homeowners 
Comm., 90 Cal. Rptr. at 90. 
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that the Barnes Commission used as a model for how planned 
development can promote the Visions of 2020,,93 Columbia is devel-
oped under a New Town Zoning District,194 a floating zone containing 
authorization for mixed uses, public amenities, and a range of 
densities. 195 The zoning also provides flexibility to accommodate 
staged, long term development that may be subject to changes in 
market conditions. After a general concept plan is approved at the 
. zoning stage,196 more detailed site plans are approved by a planning 
board that functions as an administrative agency exercising delegated 
responsibilities for site specific development under both design and 
performance standards specified by the zoning district. 197 
Columbia is near completion with a population of 75,000 people 
living within an area of about 15,000 acres. 198 The creation of 
visionary developer James W. Rouse, Columbia reflects the best of 
the flexible techniques as it incorporates mixed uses and cluster forms 
of development within an average gross density of two and one half 
dwelling units per acre and preserves about one-third of the total 
area, over 5,000 acres, for open space, recreational amenities, and 
sensitive area protection. 199 Growth has avoided wetlands and other 
sensitive areas, significant public facilities were provided by the 
developer, and approvals were achieved with a minimum of delay 
and expense given the size of the project. 200 The Columbia model 
has been applied throughout Maryland in a number of smaller' scale 
projects that provide a similar combination of public benefits and 
streamlined regulation.201 
The use of these flexible techniques is discretionary for local 
governments,202 but they are clearly superior to traditional zoning in 
directing growth to suitable areas. Their use can assist in streamlining 
193. BAY REPORT, supra note I, at 9. 
194. HOWARD COUNTY, MD., ZONING REGULATIONS § 122 (1985); MORTON HOPPEN-
FELD, THE COLUMBIA PROCESS: THE POTENTIAL FOR NEW TOWNS (1971). 
195. HOWARD COUNTY, MD., ZONING REGULATIONS § 122A.8 (1985). 
196. [d. § 122B. 
197. [d. § 122C. 
198. THE ROUSE CO., COLUMBIA, MARYLAND-HISTORY 2 (June 1993) [hereinafter 
HISTORY); HOPPENFELD, supra note 194, at 16. 
199. THE ROUSE CO., 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 17 (1991); HOPPENFELD, supra note 
194, at 16; HISTORY, supra note 198, at 2. 
200. See generally HOPPENFELD, supra note 194. 
201. For example, Montgomery Village is a planned new town of mixed uses and 
densities and contains substantial open space with a population of 35,000 
people living in 12,000 homes within an area of 2,500 acres. This project, 
which is located in central Montgomery County, was developed under a zoning 
scheme very similar to Howard County's New Town Zoning District and 
carefully linked planning and zoning approvals. WILLIAM N. HURLEY, JR., 
MONTGOMERY VILLAGE-A NEW TOWN-TwENTY YEARS LATER 23-24 (1987). 
202. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 10.01 (1988 & Supp. 1994). 
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development review. For example, the flexible techniques can be 
combined with existing development review procedures so that site 
plan, subdivision, or permit reviews can occur simultaneously to 
reduce delay. The Commission should be authorized to establish 
policy guidance and incentives so that these techniques are not 
misapplied or ignored. Revisions to state law are needed to expand 
the basis for use of Euclidean zoning in a site specific context for 
greater flexibility, as well as to promote use of floating zones as a 
desirable alternative. Without greater incentives to use these flexible 
techniques, sprawl development and cumbersome regulatory practices 
will likely continue. 
B. Affordable Housing 
Maryland has made the provlSlon of affordable housing a part 
of state policy. 203 Many jurisdictions have initiated efforts to en-
courage the development of more affordable housing and use a 
variety of techniques to promote the goal.204 Some use regulatory 
approaches that require affordable housing as a component of larger 
development projects. 20S Others simply encourage affordable housing 
through incentive zoning,206 authorization for accessory housing on 
existing 10ts,207 or relaxation of zoning design standards.208 
One inclusionary zoning technique used to promote affordable 
housing is known as the moderately priced dwelling unit (MPDU) 
203. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, §§ 1O.01(a)(3), 12.01 (Supp. 1994). California and 
Oregon have adopted state policies promoting affordable housing. See DANIEL 
R. MANDELKER, Land Use Law §§ 7.30-7.31 (3d ed. 1993); see also NATIONAL 
HOUSING TASK FORCE, A DECENT PLACE TO LIVE 50-51 (Mar., 1988) (discussing 
means of reducing regulatory constraints on the production of affordable 
housing) [hereinafter ROUSE REPORT, after its Chairman, James W. Rouse]; 
see DEGRovE, supra note 9, at 21. 
204. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 17-20. 
205. The regulatory approval requires some minimum level of affordable housing. 
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 18. 
206. Incentive zoning uses a voluntary approach that offers higher densities in 
exchange for an affordable housing component. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 
5, at 18. 
207. Accessory housing employs existing single family structures or lots to expand 
the housing stock primarily through accessory apartments or separate "granny" 
flats which are authorized by right or under a special exception process. ANNUAL 
REPORT, supra note 5, at 19. 
208. Relaxation of design standards permits housing to be constructed at lower cost. 
This technique includes relaxation of minimum area, lot, and yard requirements. 
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 19-20. Some jurisdictions hold design 
standards invalid if not rationally related to legitimate zoning objectives. See, 
e.g., Builders Servo Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 545 A.2d 530, 550 
(Conn. 1988). 
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program, which is specifically authorized in Maryland. 209 The MPDU 
program is designed to promote housing opportunities for persons 
and families who would otherwise be excluded from the housing 
market. 2lO This program is being used more frequently as a result of 
pressures brought on by court decisions and state laws that prompt 
local government to increase the availability of affordable housing.211 
MPDUs promote affordable housing as a set aside program in which 
below market housing is provided by developers in exchange for 
density bonuses.212 The program is administered with limitations 
imposed on the use, cost, and resale of the housing.213 
Several Maryland jurisdictions, on their own initiative, have 
included affordable housing as an element of their comprehensive 
plan.214 Montgomery County was the first county in Maryland to 
actually adopt a program for mandatory set asides for all housirig 
projects of fifty units or more in which the approved density is two 
dwelling units per acre or greater. 215 The Montgomery County pro-
gram was adopted in 1973.216 In the same year a similar program in 
neighboring Fairfax County, Virginia, was invalidated by the Virginia 
courtS.217 Montgomery County adopted the program under its general 
home rule police powers,218 rather than its zoning powers, due to the 
absence of specific zoning enabling authority, a fatal defect for the 
Fairfax County scheme. 219 The Montgomery County program has 
never been challenged and, with the adoption of specific state ena-
bling authority, 220 is unlikely to be attacked on the basis of lack of 
authority. 
209. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 1O.01(a)(3) (Supp. 1994). 
210. ROUSE REPORT, supra note 203, at 50-51. 
211. See Britton v. Town of Chester, 595 A.2d 492 (N.H. 1991); Southern Burlington 
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983) (Mt. 
Laurel II); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 
336 A.2d 713 (N.J.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (Mt. Laurel I); 
RATHKOPF, supra note 114, § 17.05(2)[d). 
212. See ROUSE REPORT, supra note 203, at 49-50. 
213. See MANDELKER, supra note 202, §§ 7.26-7.28. 
214. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 17; see, e.g., HOWARD COUNTY, MD., 1990 
GENERAL PLAN, supra note 12, 103-09, MONTGOMERY COUNTY DEP'T OF Hous-
ING & COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, HOUSING POLICY FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY 
IN THE 1980s (1981). 
215. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE ch. 25A, §§ 1-12 (1984). 
216. Chap. 17, LAWS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., ch. 17 (1974); INVENTORY OF 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN MONTGOMERY COUNTY 11 (1994) [hereinafter INVEN-
TORY). 
217. Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County V. DeGroff Enters., 198 S.E.2d 600, 
602 (Va. 1973). 
218. MD. ANN. CODE art. 25A, § 5(s) (1994); MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CHARTER, 
adopted Nov. 5, 1968; INVENTORY, supra note 216, at 11. 
219. Board of Supervisors of Fairfax, 198 S.E.2d at 602. 
220. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 10.01 (1988 & Supp. 1994). 
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The Montgomery County program started producing MPDUs by 
1976. 221 The program requires that each eligible housing project 
include between twelve and one half percent and fifteen percent of 
its total density as MPDUs.222 The builder may obtain a density 
bonus of up to twenty two percent over and above the authorized 
zoning density depending on site specific factors evaluated by the 
Planning Board223-the administrative agency responsible for moni-
toring compliance with the program and approving waivers under 
certain circumstances.224 
A county or nonprofit housing agency is given first priority to 
purchase up to forty percent of the MPDUs in each project. 225 The 
remaining MPDUs are sold to eligible buyers meeting income stan-
dards established by county regulation. 226 Eligible buyers are required 
to live in the units and resale is subject to restrictions. 227 If the 
resident sells the unit within the first ten years, the seller may only 
receive the original purchase price and a cost of living index in-
crease.228 If the resident sells the unit at a fair market price after the 
ten year period, the sale is subject to a recapture provision of fifty 
percent of any excess profits. 229 
The location of affordable housing can be controversial. 230 Con-
flicts may arise between the developer, the local housing agency, and 
neighbors. In one case, a developer of an upscale residential project 
sought to locate the MPDUs off site, claiming that affordable housing 
residents would be better off at an alternative location because the 
upscale neighborhood lacked convenient access to public transpor-
tation and employment centers, and that the residents could not 
afford expensive membership fees for community pool and recrea-
tional facilities. 231 Nonetheless, the county required the MPDUs to 
be located on the site.m 
221. Interview with Eric Larsen, MPDU Coordinator, Montgomery County De-
partment of Housing and Community Development (DHCD) (Aug. 24, 1993); 
DHCD STATUS REPORT MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., DEP'T OF HOUSING & 
COMMUNITY DEY., SUMMARY, REPORT & STATISTICAL PROFILE OF THE MPDU 
PROGRAM, 1989-91, (1993) (on file with author). 
222. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE ch. 25A, § 5 (1984). 
223. [d.; Larsen interview, supra note 221. 
224. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE ch 25A, § 5 (1984). 
225. [d. § 7; Larsen interview, supra note 221. 
226. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE ch. 25A, § 4. 
227. [d. § 9. 
228. [d. 
229. [d. 
230. Kevin Sullivan, Some in Potomac Shudder at "Affordable" Housing, WASH. 
POST, May 17, 1993, at B1. 
231. [d. 
232. [d. 
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The Montgomery County program compares favorably with New 
Jersey's famous court imposed Mt. Laurel housing program.233 The 
Montgomery County program has produced 8,442 MPDUs over 
seventeen years,234 while the entire state of New Jersey has produced 
13,723 Mt. Laurel units during a similar period.235 The Montgomery 
County program has achieved national recognition and serves as a 
model for other Maryland jurisdictions. 236 
The need for affordable housing is well established,237 and the 
recent amendments in state law will, no doubt, promote more of it 
than would otherwise be available. Unfortunately, the policy for 
affordable housing is discretionary for local governments, which are 
not required to include affordable housing as an element of local 
comprehensive plans.238 This flaw should be corrected by requiring 
affordable housing as a mandatory element of local plans, which 
must then be implemented under the consistency requirement. If 
applied as intended, this will minimize the gap between planning 
objectives and regulatory practices. There is also a need to assign to 
the Commission the responsibility for determining minimum levels 
of participation.239 Local governments should be required to authorize 
sufficient densities in designated growth areas to support affordable 
housing programs240 and use the set aside authority to provide af-
fordable housing as components of developments of a certain size. 
C. Resource Conservation and Protection oj Sensitive Areas 
Protection of sensitive areas is a special concern of the Planning 
Act, which delineates four areas for consideration: streams and their 
buffers, habitats of threatened and endangered species, steep slopes, 
and 100 year floodplains. 241 These four areas are particularly suscep-
tible to damage by the cumulative impact of development. 242 The 
range of protection currently afforded these areas varies from non-
233. See generally Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount 
Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983) (Mt. Laurel II); Southern Burlington County 
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J.), cert. denied 423 
U.S. 808 (1975) (Mt. Laurel I); INVENTORY, supra note 216, at 11-15. 
234. Larsen interview, supra note 221. 
235. Robert Hanley, Open Housing Is Mired in Lawsuits Again, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
2, 1990, at 81. 
236. Larsen interview, supra note 221; see ROUSE REPORT, supra note 203, at 27; 
William K. Stevens, Scattered Low-Cost Housing Offers Renewed Hope to 
Poor and Minorities, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1988, at B6. 
237. ROUSE REPORT, supra note 203, at 5-8. 
238. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 668, § 12.01(a) (Supp. 1994). 
239. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 34-35, 50-51. 
240. Id.; see DEGROVE, supra note 9, at 20-21. 
241. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 3.06(b) (Supp. 1994). 
242. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 16-17. 
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existent tei very stringent. 243 The Commission has identified the need 
to implement this state policy through regulation, the responsibility 
for which squarely rests on local governments. 244 
Farms and forests are the most threatened resources,245 yet the 
Planning Act provides little in the way of protective measures. 
Protection of these resources is primarily the responsibility of local 
government and can only be achieved through restrictive zoning 
regulations that prohibit harmful uses. 246 Restrictive zoning means 
density low enough to discourage sprawl development and yet provide 
some reasonable use of the land. 247 Agricultural zoning has been 
regularly upheld,248 and densities as low as one dwelling unit for 160 
acres have been determined appropriate under certain circum-
stances.249 
This type of zoning, however, represents a severe curtailment of 
property owners' expectations of potential development rights. While 
some legal experts believe that the police power supports these 
limitations without the need for compensation,250 the loss of invest-
ment backed expectations and the political consequences of these lost 
expectations may compromise or lessen the scope of regulation at 
the expense of the land to be conserved. Indeed, only five Maryland 
counties have adopted protective agricultural zoning. 251 A more prac-
tical approach employs a combination of restrictive zoning and the 
use of transferable development rights (TDRs). 
TDRs are devices used to conserve or protect areas such as 
agricultural lands, forests, historic districts or landmarks, and envi-
ronmentally sensitive areas.252 The authority for this flexible device 
was adopted in' 1986253 and has been used in Maryland254 and else-
243. For example, Worchester County has not developed goals, policies, or regu-
lations on any of the four categories, while most urban counties have stringent 
regulations. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 13-14 (Supp. 1993). 
244. See id. at 17. 
245. [d. at 34-35. 
246. Couglin, Formulating and Evaluating Agricultural Zoning Programs, APA 
JOURNAL 183, 183-92 (Spring 1991). 
247. See generally MANDELKER, supra note 203, ch. 12; DEGRovE, supra note 9, at 
21-22. 
248. [d. 
249. See County of Ada v. Henry, 668 P.2d 994 (Idaho 1983). 
250. See MANDELKER, supra note 203, § 12. 
251. The five counties requiring a minimum density of at least one dwelling unit 
per 20 acres are Anne Arundel, Baltimore, Caroline, Carroll, and Montgomery. 
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 7. 
252. MANDELKER, supra note 203, § 12.13. 
253. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 11.01 (1988). 
254. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 24 (Supp. 1993). 
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where.2SS Montgomery County inaugurated a successful TOR program 
in 1981 in order to preserve agriculture and rural open space.256 The 
program links comprehensive planning and zoning with market de-
mand for housing to provide for a viable transfer device that results 
in agricultural easements in exchange for more concentrated densities 
in designated growth areas.257 
Montgomery County adopted the program following a planning 
study that determined that rural zoning by itself was not effectively 
conserving agriculture and that large amounts of agricultural land 
were being converted to sprawl development. 2S8 The planning study 
concluded that there was a need to take stringent measures and 
recommended a massive downzoning of agricultural land to be ac-
companied by a TOR program to offset lost development expect a-
tions.259 
About 91,591 acres of agricultural land and rural open space, 
which represents twenty-eight percent of the County's 323,862 acres, 
were downzoned in 1981 from a five-acre authorized density to a 
twenty-five-acre density with a minimum lot size of 40,000 square 
feet. 260 The zoning category used for this purpose is the Rural Density 
Transfer (ROT) zone,261 which permits one dwelling unit per twenty-
five acres and creates five TORs for each twenty-five acres.262 For a 
100 acre farm, the property owner is provided with the choice of 
developing it with four residential units, retaining it in agricultural 
or open space use and selling twenty TORs, or a combination of the 
two methods. For example, the owner could develop one dwelling 
unit which automatically extinguishes one TOR, and sell the remain-
ing nineteen TORs. 
Selection of receiving areas poses both legal and political prob-
lems. 263 A receiving area is located in a designated growth area and 
255. Mandelker, supra note 203, § 12.13; see, e.g., Gardner v. New Jersey Pinelands 
Comm'n, 593 A.2d 251 (N.J. 1991); Barancik v. County of Marin, 872 F.2d 
834 (9th Cir. 1988), cerl. denied, 493 U.S. 894 (1989). 
256. MARYLAND-NATIONAL CAPITAL PARK AND PLANNING COMMISSION, THE TRANS-
FERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS PROGRAM FOR THE PRESERVATION OF AGRICUL-
TURE AND RURAL OPEN SPACE, STATUS REPORT (July 1992) [hereinafter TDR 
STATUS REPORT). 
257. [d. at 1-5. 
258. MARYLAND-NATIONAL CAPITAL PARK & PLANNING COMMISSION, FUNCTIONAL 
MASTER PLAN FOR THE PRESERVATION OF AGRICULTURAL & RURAL OPEN SPACE 
IN MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., 12-25 (1980). 
259. [d. at 27-31. 
260. NORMAN L. CHRIST ELLER, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP TO EVALUATE THE 
AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL OPEN SPACE PRESERVATION PROGRAMS 13-14 (Feb. 
2, 1988) [hereinafter TDR WORKING GROUP REPORT); TDR STATUS REPORT, 
supra note 256, at 1-14. 
261. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., ZONING ORDINANCE § 59-C-9.6 (1994). 
262. [d. §§ 59-C-9.41, 59-C-9.6. 
263. See TDR WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 260, at 15-21. 
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will host density increases above the level authorized by conventional 
zoning. 264 Density increases may generate opposition from the nearby 
community. An attack by neighbors produced a temporary invali-
dation of the Montgomery County program265 and prompted curative 
measures to readopt the program with adequate zoning districts. 266 
The program currently employs a variety of receiving area zoning 
districts,267 which are normally applied by comprehensive zoning at 
locations specified as suitable for higher densities by master plans. 268 
Once the receiving areas are applied to the zoning map, the 
program is implemented through the subdivision process.269 When a 
developer acquires TDRs for use on land zoned for higher TDR 
density, a subdivision plan must be approved with the TOR sale and 
an easement recordation verified.270 A county agency responsible for 
subdivision approval provides oversight and monitors the implemen-
tation of the system.271 All sales and easement recordation data are 
retained in computer-based storage, which is used to verify the TOR 
implementation process.272 To date, the system has worked success-
fully, without incidents of fraud or attempts to reuse TDRs.273 
Montgomery County's program has been implemented in an 
incremental fashion with more receiving areas being designated as 
comprehensive planning and zoning actions identifying suitable areas 
fQr growth.274 When the program was first established there were no 
receiving areas designated,27S and a TOR fund was created to purchase 
TDRs in hardship situations. 276 Notwithstanding the absence of re-
ceiving areas, the program survived a legal challenge.277 
The Montgomery County program is gradually achieving equi-
librium between supply and demand. Not all land classified in the 
RDT zone is appropriate to be under a TOR easement because some 
of it is public parkland or open space, some is already under either 
264. [d. ~ 
265. See West Montgomery Citizens Ass'n v. Maryland-National Capital Park & 
Planning Comm'n, 309 Md. 183, 186, 522 A.2d 1328, 1329 (1987). 
266. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., ZONING ORDINANCE § 59-C-1.33 (1994). 
267. See id. 
268. TOR WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 260, at 13-14. 
269. [d. at 15-21. 
270. [d. 
271. [d. 
272. Interview with Oenis Canavan, Senior Planner and TOR Coordinator, Mary-
land-National Capital Park and Planning Commission (Aug. 24, 1993). 
273. [d. 
274. [d. 
275. See TOR Working Group Report, supra note 260, at I. 
276. [d. 
277. Oefour v. Montgomery County Council, Law Nos. 56964, 56969, 56983, Circuit 
Court for Montgomery County (1983) (J. McAullife). 
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state or county agricultural easement, and some is already developed 
for residential purposes.278 About 26,182 acres fall within these cat-
egories and will not use TO Rs. 279 The remaining 65,409 acres represent 
potential TOR sending areas for 12,297 TORs.280 By July, 1992, the 
designated receiving areas increased to a level capable of hosting 
11,650 TORs.281 As the supply and demand have, more or less, settled 
into equilibrium, the unit price of the TORs has reached about 
$10,000.282 The TOR fund was never used and was eliminated by 
administrati ve actio n. 283 
The TOR program will be completed when the remaining TORs 
are sold and easements recorded. 284 So far, easements have been 
recorded for 3,185 TORs, resulting in a minimum of 15,925 acres 
being preserved for agriculture and rural open space. 285 There are 
2,174 additional TDRs sold and awaiting approval under the subdi-
vision process, which will result in an additional 10,870 acres under 
easement. 286 This total of 26,795 acres under a TOR easement rep-
resents about forty-one percent of the potential supply under the 
program. 287 
Resource conservation and protection of sensitive areas are prime 
objectives of the Visions of 2020 because of their direct relationship 
to the health of the Chesapeake Bay.288 Without protective zoning 
and other regulatory measures, the objectives will not be achieved. 
Once local governments determine the areas to be protected as part 
of a local plan, there must be corresponding regulation of these 
areas. If this effort does not occur, then the state must consider 
imposition of regulation as recommended by the 2020 proposals289 
because these areas are far too important to risk to future develop-
ment. 
D. Funding Mechanisms 
The Visions of 2020 anticipated that funding mechanisms would 
be in place to support growth in suitable areas. 290 In effect, the 
278. TOR WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 260, at 16. 
279. See TOR Status Report, supra note 256. 
280. Id. 
281. Id. 
282. Canavan Interview, supra note 272. 
283. Id. 
284. [d. 
285. TOR STATUS REPORT, supra note 256, at 8. 
286. [d. 
287. Id. 
288. BAY REPORT, supra note 1. The American Farmland Trust recently concluded 
that four Maryland counties are at risk of losing substantial areas of farmland 
to development. Deb Riechmann, Four Maryland Counties Losing Ground, 
MONTGOMERY J., July 19, 1993, at A3. 
289. Maryland Growth and Chesapeake Bay Protection Act of 1991; S. 227, 1991 
Sess. (Md. 1991); H.D. 214, 1991 Sess. (Md. 1991). 
290. 2020 REPORT, supra note 3. 
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Visions contemplate a concurrency standard291 that requires that 
adequate public facilities be in place for areas where development is 
to be approved.292 Concurrency means that growth can only be 
considered suitable if roads, schools, parks, and other necessary 
public facilities are adequate to support the growth.293 If funding 
mechanisms are not in place to provide these facilities concurrent 
with anticipated growth, then the designated area is not suitable for 
growth until the necessary facilities are available. 294 The Planning 
Act, however, modified the policy pertaining to funding mechanisms 
and substituted a vague objective that funding mechanisms need only 
be addressed.295 This modification is a significant retreat from the 
Visions of 2020. 
The practice of deferring growth and related development ap-
provals until public facilities are deemed adequate has received ju-
dicial support in Maryland based on all types of public facilities. 296 
The adequacy of public facilities is usually measured in terms of 
levels of service (LOS)297 under standards contained in an adequate 
public facilities ordinance (APFO) or related growth policy docu-
ments. 298 The purpose of the APFO is to ensure that development 
does not occur unless the capacity of public facilities is adequate to 
absorb the proposed growth. 299 
. The APFO is a regulatory device used to control the timing and 
pace of development, the use and density of which has already been 
authorized by zoning.3°O Applied before development authorizations 
are issued, the APFO permits local government to evaluate the impact 
of development on existing and planned public facilities and delay 
development approvals if the facilities are found to be inadequate to 
accommodate the proposed growth under a LOS threshold deemed 
appropriate for a particular locality.30I 
291.. See generally DEGROVE, supra note 9, at 7, 16-20 (discussing the concept of 
concurrency). 
292. [d. 
293. [d. 
294. [d. 
295. MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 5-708(7) (Supp. 1994). 
296. Shapiro v. Montgomery County, 269 Md. 380, 388, 306 A.2d 253, 257 (1973) 
(schools); Montgomery County Council v. Pleasants, 266 Md. 462, 466-67, 295 
A.2d 216, 217 (1972) (sewers); Price v. Cohen, 213 Md. 457, 464, 132 A.2d 
125, 129 (1957) (roads). 
297. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., ANNUAL GROWTH POLICY, July, 1993; William 
E. Baumgaertner & John W. Guckert, APFO: A Successful Growth Manage-
ment Tool, 1993 J. OF MD. PLANNING 10; DEGROVE, supra note 9, at 17-20. 
298. See supra note 296. 
299. See supra note 296. 
300. See supra note 296. 
301. See supra note 296. 
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The APFO is now authorized for discretionary use by local 
governments. 302 State law neglects, however, to provide any policy 
direction on the use of the APFO. The more effective APFOs address 
a range of public facilities and evaluate the cumulative impact of 
·growth. 303 Some APFOs, however, have limited application and do 
not evaluate public facilities that are the responsibility of other levels 
of government,304 or focus only on the immediate area,305 or examine 
only present conditions without considering future growth.306 These 
shortcomings cause an underestimate of future growth that will be 
unsupported by adequate facilities over time. 307 
If an APFO review finds inadequacy, then funding mechanisms 
must be identified which are reasonably probable of fruition in the 
foreseeable future308 and will provide adequate facilities to support 
the development. 309 If state or local governments are unable to provide 
funding, alternative sources must be identified if the development is 
to be approved.310 The APFO usually contains provisions for miti-
gation to allow development to proceed so long as private sector 
funding provides the necessary facilities. 311 
Flexible zoning is another technique that affects funding for 
public facilities. Incentive zoning provides public amenities or facilities 
that reduce the need for public funding sources.312 Mixed use zoning 
provides a balance between employment and housing which encourages 
pedestrian traffic and shorter vehicle trips, thus easing the impact of 
growth on transportation facilities and public funding sources. 313 
Several other techniques include development agreements314 and vari-
ous types of private sector contributions through impact fees315 or 
302. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 10.01 (Supp. 1994). The Commission reports that 
12 counties and 10 municipalities have enacted APFOs. ANNUAL REPORT, supra 
note 5, Supplement, Matrix 2.8A, 2.8B, at 31-36. 
303. Baumgaertner, supra note 297. 
304. See supra note 302; Philip J. Tierney, Maryland's Growing Pains: The Need 
jor State Regulation, 16 U. BALT. L. REV. 201, 238 (1987). 
305. Tierney, supra note 304, at 238-40. 
306. Id. 
307. Id. 
308. Montgomery County v. Greater Colesville Citizens Ass'n, 70 Md. App. 374, 
387-88, 521 A.2d 770, 777 (1987). 
309. MONTGOMERY COUNTY ANNUAL GROWTH POLICY 13-16 (July, 1993). 
310. Greater Colesville, 70 Md. App. at 387-88, 521 A.2d at 777 . 
. 311. Baumgaertner, supra note 297; see Golden v. Planning Bd .• 285 N.E.2d 291 
(N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972). 
312. Kayden, supra note 178. 
313. BAY REPORT, supra note I, at 7. 
314. Delaney, supra note 188. 
315. DEGRovE, supra note 9, at 24. Maryland courts require explicit authority for 
impact fees. and home rule authority has been held insufficient as a basis for 
these fees. Eastern Diversified Properties, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 319 
Md. 45, 570 A.2d 850 (1990). 
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development taxes. 316 A new funding mechanism was authorized in 
1992 and provides for off-site improvements under certain circum-
stances.317 The authorization for off-site improvements allows exac-
tions for needed facilities and wisely includes a nexus requirement,318 
which codifies both Maryland319 and federaP20 legal requirements for 
the imposition of exactions. 
Funding mechanisms are critical to concentrating growth in 
suitable areas. Use of the concurrency standard provides an important 
incentive to direct growth to areas with excess infrastructure but in 
need of revitalization. 321 Yet, the Planning Act provides a weakened 
policy objective that needs to be strengthened in order to make the 
state growth policy consistent with the Visions of 2020. The Com-
mission should also be assigned rule-making authority for the use of 
growth management regulations. 
V. POTENTIAL IMPEDIMENTS TO STATE POLICY 
Achievement of the state growth policy will be difficult enough 
without having to deal with several potential impediments to the 
effective implementation of the policy. These impediments include 
the takings challenge, shifts in the presumption of regulatory validity, 
the inability to employ site-specific use conditions when discretionary 
zoning is approved, and the application of a strict vested rights 
doctrine. 
A. Takings Challenge 
The takings challenge is based on the Fifth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and its Just Compensation Clause.322 The 
challenge is concerned with land use regulations imposing onerous 
burdens on certain property owners that should more fairly be 
316. DEGRavE, supra note 9, at 24. A development impact tax was upheld as a 
properly authorized excise tax. Waters Landing Ltd. Ptnshp.· v. Montgomery 
County, 337 Md. 15, 650 A.2d 712 (1994). 
317. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § IO.Ol(a)(2) (Supp. 1994). 
318. [d. 
319. Howard County v. J.J.M., Inc., 301 Md. 256, 282, 482 A.2d 908, 921 (1984). 
320. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-37 (1987); Dolan 
v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994). 
321. Kaplan, supra note 17. 
322. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which is incorporated 
against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, Chicago B & 0 R.R. v. 
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897), provides that "private property [shall not) 
be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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assumed by the public.m How the takings challenge is applied 
involves an examination of the character of the reguiationJ24 and the 
impact on the affected property.325 In 1922, when the United States 
Supreme Court, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,326 held that a 
noninvasive police power regulation went "too far" and became a 
"taking" of private property by the government, the seeds of the 
regulatory takings doctrine were planted and its first fruits would be 
produced years later to the consternation of local government offi-
cials.327 
Because the Supreme Court ignored the regulatory takings doc-
trine for over fifty years,328 state courts initially determined the limits 
of land use regulations under a substantive due process analysis and 
violations involved the traditional remedy of invalidation of the 
regulation. 329 As the states were formulating their due process juris-
prudence, a more narrow view of property emerged that subordinated 
private property rights in favor of the general welfare. 330 The New 
Deal, the decline of the Lochner33 I era view of property rights,332 and 
the development of administrative law provided the basis for the 
emergence of more deference to legislative action, particularly with 
323. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); MANDELKER, supra note 
203, § 2.01; Norman N. Williams, Jr., A Narrow Escape?, 16 ZONING & 
PLANNING LAW REPORT 113, 115-17 (1993). 
324. MANDELKER, supra note 203, § 2.01. 
325. Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49 (1960); MANDELKER, supra note 203, § 2.01; 
Williams, supra note 323, at 115-17. 
326. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
327. See Williams, supra note 323, at 123-26; Charles R. Wise, The Changing 
Doctrine of Regulatory Takings and the Executive Branch, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 
403, 409-13 (1992). 
328. Forty-six years elapsed between the two regulatory takings cases. Pennsylvania 
Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City 
of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
329. MANDELKER, supra note 203, § 2.25; Williams, supra note 323, at 115-17. 
330. The progressive income tax, welfare programs, and rent control are several 
examples. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 
1870-1960, at 3-7, 213-46, 263-64 (1992). Subordination of property rights to 
larger public interest concerns is not simply a product of progressive legal 
thinkers but enjoys a wider following. For example, Pope John Paul, II, 
provided the following view about subordination of private property rights: 
Christian tradition has never upheld [private property ... rights) as 
absolute and untouchable. On the contrary, it has always understood 
this right within the broader context of the right common to all to 
use the goods of the whole of creation: the right to private property 
is subordinated to the right to common use, to the fact that goods 
are meant for everyone. 
THE ENCYCLICAL LETTER OF POPE JOHN PAUL II, LABOREM EXERCENS ch. 14, 
at 35, Sept. 14, 1981 (emphasis in original). 
331. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
332. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
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respect to land use regulation. 333 With changing notions of property 
and the decline of Lochner influence, conservative thinkers returned 
to the Holmes dictum in Pennsylvania Coal for support and, begin-
ning in the 1970s, the takings challenge began to emerge in a new 
package with links for the first time to the Just Compensation Clause 
instead of the Due Process Clause. 334 
The Supreme Court first considered this new takings challenge 
in 1978 in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York. 335 
The Court declined to formulate any fixed rules, however. 336 The 
Court's then liberal majority expressed a preference for a case by 
case evaluation. The Court applied a balancing test with three ele-
ments: the character of the government action, the extent to which 
the regulations affect investment-backed expectations, and the eco-
nomic impact of the regulations.337 Subsequently, however, the Court's 
increasingly conservative membership succeeded in establishing fixed 
rules about property rights338 and began to identify categories that 
limited the scope of legislative actions and the deference to be 
accorded them.339 
A more conservative Supreme Court in three recent decisions, 
No//an v. California Coastal Commission,341l Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, 341 and Dolan v. City of Tigard,342 began a shift 
away from the view that property is a creation of law and its 
regulation is entitled to judicial deference. No//an abandoned tradi-
tional deference as applied in other types of constitutional challenges343 
333. HORWITZ, supra note 330, at 213-46; Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 
U.S. 590 (1962). 
334. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), was, of course, a due 
process case and did not involve the Just Compensation Clause despite the 
dictum of Justice Holmes. Patrick C. McGinley, Regulatory "Takings": The 
Remarkable Resurrection of Economic Substantive Due Process Analysis in 
Constitutional Law, 17 ENVIR. LAW RPTR. 10369 (Sept. 1987); Williams, supra 
note 323, at 117-26; Wise, supra note 327, at 409-13. The just compensation 
theory of regulatory takings was initially rejected by two leading state courts. 
See Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d 381 (N.Y.), 
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 990 (1976); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25 (Cal. 
1979), afi'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
335. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
336. [d. at 124. 
337. [d. 
338. Williams, supra note 323, at 117-26. 
339. [d.; Robert A. Williams, Jr., Legal Discourse, Social Vision and the Supreme 
Court's Land Use Planning Law: The Genealogy of the Lochnerian Recurrence 
in First English Lutheran Church and Nollan, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 427, 455-
73 (1988). 
340. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
341. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). 
342. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994). 
343. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 n.3. 
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and shifted the presumption of validity normally accorded land use 
regulations at least when an invasive regulation is involved. 344 Lucas 
further eroded traditional deference with the application of a com-
mon-law nuisance baseline to regulations that destroy value. 345 Lucas 
rejected the liberal contention that regulations necessary for public 
health or safety purposes, which sometimes exact uneven burdens on 
property owners, are still entitled to deference because the legislature 
is the best forum to resolve distributive issues. 346 Instead, Lucas 
reasserted longstanding conservative suspicions of the legislature347 
and limited the impact of Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. 
De Benedictis,348 which provided the basis for the state court's 
affirmation of the South Carolina beach protection regulation. 349 The 
Keystone majority had earlier suggested that regulations with health 
and safety objectives were virtually immune from a takings challenge 
under a nuisance exception. 350 Keystone was modified on this point,351 
but was not directly overruled. 
Dolan continued the recent trend to undercut traditional pres-
umptions of validity and deference to the legislature by imposing 
new requirements for local governments to establish both a reasonable 
nexus and rough proportionality between exactions and the impact 
of development. 352 Exactions, the requirement for contribution of 
property or money to alleviate the impact of development in exchange 
for development approval, are customary devices used by local gov-
ernments to obtain property or funds for roads, schools, parks, and 
other public facilities, the need for which is caused at least in part 
by the new development. 353 When the government seeks to acquire a 
property right-such as the right to exclude-the burden is now on 
the government to establish adequate nexus and proportionality using 
an individualized analysis and subject to heightened judicial scru-
344. Some believe that Nollan's heightened scrutiny is limited to situations involving 
a permanent physical occupation. See Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 
COL. L. REV. 1600, 1612-14 (1988). 
345. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). 
346. Id. The decision also threatens the basis for all environmental regulations that 
limit property to natural uses. See Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the 
Economy oj Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 
45 STAN. L. REV. 1433 (1993). 
347. HORWITZ, supra note 330, at 213-46. 
348. 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
349. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (1991), rev'd, 112 
S. Ct. 2886 (1992). 
350. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De Benedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
351. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2886. 
352. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994). 
353. See id. at 2317-19. 
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tiny.354 Since the local government in Dolan was attempting to 
implement state policy under a comprehensive plan and regulation, 
the Supreme Court's decision is a disappointing loss for plan-based 
regulation because the majority neglected to analyze the total eco-
nomic impact of the government's action on the property owner. As 
Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent, the Court chose to ignore 
both the benefits received by the property owner from the govern-
ment's approval and the impact of the government's actions on the 
value of the whole parcel,355 and instead imposed a Lochner era type 
review to support a finding of an unconstitutional condition. 356 
Despite the conservative trend in recent decisions, there has not 
been a substantial redefinition of property when a takings analysis 
is required.357 Before Dolan, a discrete property interest could not 
be conceptually severed358 from the whole parcel and considered 
individually for a takings analysis without reference to the effect of 
the regulation on the entire parcel. Dolan modified this view at least 
as it applies to discrete property interest sought by the government 
for public use by way of dedication. 359 Nevertheless, Dolan does not 
threaten protective zoning for farmlands, floodplains, or other en-
vironmental purposes even if the value of the property is substantially 
diminished by the regulation. In this respect, the whole parcel analysis 
is still viable. 360 Indeed, if the whole parcel approach is abandoned, 
354. See id. The heightened judicial scrutiny is applied in an adjudicative setting 
and may not apply when the challenged regulatory action is legislative in 
character. 
355. Id. at 2324-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In its takings analysis, the conservative 
majority ignored the factor of increased property values resulting from gov-
ernment approvals and other actions such as infrastructure improvements. See 
id. at 2319-22; see also Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 
442 (Wis. 1965). Surely, the increased property values represent a legitimate 
factor in any taking analysis to determine the true economic impact of gov-
ernment action on a particular property. See Edward Thompson, Jr., The 
Government Giveth, II ENVIRON. FORUM, No.2 at 22 (Mar.! Apr. 1994). 
356. Dwight H. Merriam & R. Jeffrey Lyman, Dealing with Dolan, Practically and 
Jurisprudentially, 17 ZONING & PLANNING L. REP. 57, 62-63 (Sept., 1994). 
357. The majority in Dolan was narrowly applied and exempted protective zoning 
from the decision. See Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2309. Nevertheless, the Lucas 
majority did signal that a clarification of the affected property interest and 
the notion of a partial taking remain on the conservative agenda. Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 n.7, 2895 n.8 (1992). 
Support for both points are found in Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 
28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994), and Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 18 
F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
358. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception oj Property: Cross Currents 
in the Jurisprudence oj Takings, 88 COL. L. REV. 1667, 1674-78 (1988). 
359. In this respect, the decision involves an invasive regulation as in Nollan and 
may be limited to that situation. See Michelman, supra note 344. 
360. Williams, supra note 323, at 123-27. See Richard M. Frank, Inverse Condem-
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every residential front yard setback restriction will be vulnerable to 
attack even though the entire lot enjoys a reasonable use361 and 
property owners could manipulate conveyances under existing regu-
lations to create takings while enjoying reasonable and profitable 
uses on their remaining interests. 
States may be reluctant to replace their long-established tests for 
evaluating takings challenges. There are difficulties inherent in the 
application of these Supreme Court decisions.362 The Supreme Court 
of Washington has twice tried to formulate an application of the 
United States Supreme Court's rules to land use regulations and 
produced confusion for both regulators and developers.363 Maryland 
has long followed an analysis centering on denial of all reasonable 
use.364 The Maryland courts have yet to apply the fixed rules and 
prefer the case by case approach with deference to the legislature on 
issues of public purposes of the regulation and a focus on the 
economic impact of the regulation. 365 
The takings challenge is now well established and provides 
boundaries beyond which government regulation should not go. 
Recent Supreme Court decisions will require local governments to 
exercise careful planning and administration when providing discre-
tionary approvals in exchange for public amenities. The government 
may be required to demonstrate that the public amenities bear a 
reasonable relationship and a rough proportionality to the subject 
matter of the approval. 
The application of the state growth policy can certainly coexist 
with the takings challenge if local governments are careful in crafting 
nation Litigation in the 1990s- The Uncertain Legacy oj the Supreme Court's 
Lucas and Yee Decisions, 43 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 85, 102-04 
(1993). In Do/an, the majority ignored the balance of the property interests. 
Presumably, the Washington State court will evaluate the entire property interest 
when determining whether the rough proportionality test can be satisfied. 
361. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De Benedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); 
Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927). 
362. The decisions leave many questions to be resolved that include distinguishing 
between takings and substantive due process violations, identifying invasive 
and noninvasive regulations, defining the property interests to be evaluated, 
and dealing with the notion of partial takings. 
363. Compare Allingham v. City of Seattle, 749 P.2d 160 (Wash. 1988) with 
Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 787 P.2d 907 (Wash.), cert. denied, 498 
U.S. 911 (1990). 
364. For recent discussions of Maryland's takings jurisprudence, see Lone v. Mont-
gomery County, 85 Md. App. 477, 584 A.2d 142 (1991); Offen v. County 
Council, 96 Md. App. 526, 625 A.2d 424 (1993), rev'd on other grounds, 
County Council v. Offen, 334 Md. 499, 639 A.2d 1070 (1994). 
365. Maryland courts have applied a whole parcel analysis when evaluating the 
economic impact of a regulation. See North v. St. Mary's County, 99 Md. 
App. 502, 638 A.2d 1175 (1994). 
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their regulations and state law is revised to provide better policy 
direction. The takings challenge underscores the need for the use by 
local governments of the flexible techniques and streamlined ap-
proaches now authorized under state law. These new approaches will 
enable local governments to adopt regulations for site-specific con-
ditions and provide for a variety of uses that will benefit both the 
property owner and the public. 
B. Shift in Presumption of Validity 
Since at least 1926 and Euclid v. A mbler Realty Co. ,366 a 
presumption of validity has applied to land use regulations which 
are only invalidated if clearly arbitrary and unreasonable and with 
no substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals, or 
general welfare. 367 The courts have continued to apply the presump-
tion of validity to ordinary land use disputes. 368 Generally, the 
presumption is evaluated under an ends-means test. 369 
The presumption of validity is under attack by property rights 
advocates370 and this attack corresponds to a shift in the presumption 
366. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
367. The regulation is upheld if the basis for it is "fairly debatable." Euclid, 272 
U.S. at 395. The fairly debatable standard was formulated by the Supreme 
Court in a facial challenge to a legislative action. [d. Whether this same 
standard should also be applied to administrative or adjudicatory actions is an 
interesting question after Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994), 
although Maryland courts have applied the fairly debatable standard to adju-
dicatory decisions. See Enviro-Gro Technologies v. Bockelmann, 88 Md. App. 
323, 594 A.2d 1190, cert. denied, 325 Md. 94, 599 A.2d 447 (1991). Maryland 
courts, however, have not always been deferential to the legislature when 
reviewing land use regulation. See Byrne v. Maryland Realty Co., 129 Md. 
202, 98 A. 547 (1916) (separation of semi-detached houses in residential areas 
is not a valid basis for police power regulation). 
368. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Mears v. 
Town of Oxford, 52 Md. App. 407, 449 A.2d 1165 (1982) (attacker must show 
absence of public benefit). 
369. The end purpose of the regulation must relate to legitimate government 
objectives and the means employed must be reasonable and not oppressive. 
See Levinson v. Montgomery County, 95 Md. App. 307, 620 A.2d 961, cert. 
denied, 331 Md. 197, 627 A.2d 539 (1993). The ends-means test has a long 
history in Maryland. See Byrne v. Maryland Realty Co., 129 Md. 202, 98 A. 
547 (1916) (segregation of multifamily from single family housing based on 
aesthetics, an unreasonable means); Tighe v. Osborne, 149 Md. 349, 131 A. 
801 (1925) (public welfare justification too broad to be proper end for regulation 
that restricts property rights); Tighe v. Osborne, 150 Md. 452, 133 A. 465 
(1926) (health and safety justification supports regulation against due process 
attack). 
370. President Reagan's Commission on Housing concluded in 1982 that the pre-
sumption should be replaced with a requirement that governments show that 
land use regulations are necessary to achieve a "vital and pressing governmental 
interest." BERNARD SIEGAN, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON Hous-
ING, LAND USE LAW 7 (Nov. 1982); see Williams, supra note 323, at 122-23. 
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in several areas where constitutional and important public policy 
issues are at stake.371 The presumption shifts when land use regula-
tions involve exclusionary zoning,372 unconstitutional intrusions,373 
discriminatory c1assifications,374 and malfunctions of the zoning proc-
ess. 375 
The erosion of the presumption poses a clear threat to the use 
of flexible techniques necessary to implement the state growth policy. 
For example, incentive zoning or TORs provide for added density in 
exchange for public amenities.376 Property rights advocates may con-
tend that the higher densities are being withheld for later sale, when 
they should have been applied to the land in the first place instead 
of imposing burdens on a select class of property owners who happen 
to own property with enough development potential to support the 
zoning scheme. 377 This argument concludes that the government, by 
use of these zoning schemes, expropriates market value for resale. 378 
The presumption of validity is critical to local government's 
defense of land use regulatory programs. The flexible techniques now 
authorized by state law involve redistributive measures which have 
historically enjoyed deference and would likely survive ends-means 
analysis. 379 The flexible techniques are not likely to be found to 
371. Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the Presumption of Consti-
tutionality in Land-Use Law, 24 URB. LAW. I (1992). 
372. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d 
713 (N.J.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (Mt. Laurel I); Southern Burlington 
County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983) (Mt. 
Laurel II). 
373. NoHan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); see Dolan v. City 
of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) (invasive regulatory takings); Church of the 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993) (sup-
pression of religious activity); City of Ladue v. GiHeo, 114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994); 
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993) (unrea-
sonable limitations on protected modes of expression) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring). 
374. See, e.g., Kirsch v. Prince George's County, 331 Md. 89, 626 A.2d 372, cert. 
denied, 114 S. Ct. 600 (1993); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 
473 U.S. 432 (1985); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); 
State v. Baker, 405 A.2d 368 (N.J. 1979); City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 
610 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1980); Verzi v. Baltimore County, 333 Md. 411, 635 A.2d 
967 (1994). 
375. Malfunction of the zoning process is illustrated by cases where the public 
interest is subordinated for private benefit contrary to the comprehensive plan. 
In this situation, courts do not accord the presumption to the government's 
action. MANDELKER, supra note 203. 
376. Kayden, supra note 178, at 3-8; TDR STATUS REPORT, supra note 256, at 2-5. 
377. See Kayden, supra note 178, at 3-8. 
378. 'd. 
379. See Levinson v. Montgomery County, 95 Md. App. 307,620 A.2d 961 (1993). 
The majority in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994), did not 
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constitute a takings because property owners retain valuable property 
rights. 380 The problem will occur under a substantive due process 
challenge where local government misapplies the flexible techniques 
in a shocking, arbitrary, or capricious manner. 381 Clear policy direc-
tion will minimize the risks of any shift in the presumption. 
C. Conditional Zoning 
One of the major features of the flexible techniques is the ability 
to tailor development to take advantage of unique characteristics of 
a particular site382 and rely on site-specific use conditions. 383 For 
example, PUDs often include mixed uses which vary in the type and 
intensity of use,384 and are not intended to be uniform.385 These 
flexible zoning' techniques allow for limitations on uses, density, 
building locations, and other physical features of development and 
permit local governments to respond quickly to changing market 
forces. 386 The town of Columbia, Maryland illustrates this approach 
with its substantial park land and transportation facilities all de-
pendent on conditions imposed in exchange for zoning approval. 387 
In a general sense, these techniques employ use conditions which 
may run afoul of a Maryland common-law doctrine that prohibits 
conditional zoning. 388 Although conditional zoning was authorized by 
abandon the presumption in cases involving general and noninvasive application 
of legislative policy, even when the application involves substantial diminution 
of property values. 
380. See Montgomery County v. Woodward & Lothrop, 280 Md. 686, 376 A.2d 
483 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1067 (1978). 
381. To be successful under a substantive due process claim, both a property interest 
and abusive government action must be shown. Compare Gardner v. City of 
Baltimore, 969 F.2d 63 (4th Cir. 1992), and G.M. Eng'rs & Assocs., Inc. v. 
West Bloomfield Township, 922 F.2d 328 (6th Cir. 1990) with Bateson v. 
Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1988) and Herrington v. Sonoma County, 834 
F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1987). 
382. 2 RATHKOPF, supra note 114, § 29A.02[IJ. 
383. [d. 
384. 5 RATHKOPF, supra note 114, § 63.01. 
385. [d. § 63.02. 
386. [d. 
387. HOWARD COUNTY ZONING REGULATIONS § 122 (1985). 
388. The conditional zoning doctrine finds its roots in Wakefield v. Kraft, 202 Md. 
136, 96 A.2d 27 (1953). The Court of Appeals continued to explain its 
dissatisfaction with conditional zoning in a series of decisions that involved 
the ad hoc conditions imposed by local governments at the time of zoning 
approval. See Montgomery County v. National Capital Realty Corp., 267 Md. 
364, 297 A.2d 675 (1972); Marathon Builders, Inc. v. Polinger, 263 Md. 410, 
283 A.2d 617 (1971); Carole Highlands Citizens Ass'n v. Board of Courity 
Comm'rs, 222 Md. 44, 158 A.2d 663 (1960); Pressman v. Mayor of Baltimore, 
222 Md. 330, 160 A.2d 379 (1960); Rose v. Paape, 221 Md. 369, 157 A.2d 
618 (1960); Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429 (1959). 
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the state legislature in 1975,389 the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland has narrowly construed that authorization and applied the 
conditional zoning doctrine in a manner that is not based on sound 
policy or law. 390 
Conditions imposed through the flexible zoning process could 
avoid any vulnerability under the conditional zoning doctrine if the 
conditions are made part of a traditional zoning scheme under a 
\ . 
more cumbersome approach. For example, a developer selects a sIte 
and makes plans for site specific development that are then made 
part of a zoning text amendment that authorizes the conditional 
form of development following a legislative process including plan-
ning analysis, notice, and public hearings. A new zoning district is 
then adopted which authorizes the site-specific development. The 
district is then applied to the site by either comprehensive or piecemeal 
rezoning which involves another round of planning reviews, notice, 
and hearings. Flexible zoning expedites this process by permitting the 
conditions to be imposed at the time of site-specific zoning approval 
under a very generalized zoning authorization that is available to any 
number of developers to use for different circumstances. 391 
389. The General Assembly authorized conditional zoning in a manner that (1) 
permits restrictions to protect the character and design of the area, (2) permits 
post-zoning review of design, and (3) provides for enforcement and procedural 
rights. 
The local legislative body of a county or municipal corporation, upon 
the zoning or rezoning of any land or lands ... , [I] may impose 
such additional restrictions, conditions or limitations as may be deemed 
appropriate to preserve, improve, or protect the general character and 
design of the lands and improvements being zoned or rezoned, or of 
the surrounding or adjacent lands and improvements, and [2] may, 
upon the zoning or rezoning of any land or lands, retain or reserve 
the power and authority to approve or disapprove the design of 
buildings, construction, landscaping, or other improvements, altera-
tions, and changes made or to be made on the subject land or lands 
to assure conformity with the intent and purpose of this article and 
the jurisdiction's zoning ordinance. The powers provided in this 
subsection shall be applicable only if the local legislative body adopts 
an ordinance [3] which shall include enforcement procedures and 
requirements for adequate notice of public hearings and conditions 
sought to be imposed. 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 4.01(b) (1988 & Supp. 1994) (emphasis added). 
The authorization provided safeguards to prevent the imposition of ad hoc 
conditions found so offensive in the early Maryland conditional zoning deci-
sions. Under the statutory authorization, conditions can only be applied with 
adequate notice. 
390. See Board of County Comm'rs v. H. Manny Holtz, Inc., 65 Md. App. 574, 
501 A.2d 489 (1985). 
391. See Collard v. Incorporated Village of Flower Hill, 421 N. E.2d 818 (N. Y. 
1981). 
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The conditional zoning doctrine and its hostility to site-specific 
use conditions pose a threat to the use of flexible zoning in Mary-
land.392 There are safeguards to insure that local governments exercise 
conditional use powers in a responsible manner. The conditional 
zoning authorization requires notice and a hearing. The new Planning 
Act3,!3 and related legislation394 provide a firm basis for local regu-
latory actions grounded in consistency with state policy and a com-
prehensive plan. 395 These laws diminish any policy justification for 
the conditional zoning doctrine to limit the newly authorized flexible 
zoning techniques. 
Conditional use zoning as authorized by law does not involve 
the imposition of ad hoc conditions, which initially prompted judicial 
hostility to its application,396 and is distinguishable from spot zoning, 
contract zoning, and zoning violative of uniformity. For example, 
spot zoning is simply a descriptive term involving site-specific zoning 
,392. The conditional zoning doctrine is based on concerns that site specific zoning 
with conditions may provide discriminatory benefits in favor of individual 
property owners at the expense of the larger community and involve the zoning 
authority in bargaining away public rights. The leading decision on conditional 
zoning in Maryland is Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429 
(1959), where the owner challenged a restrictive zoning condition that was 
subsequently held invalid by the court on the basis of lack of authority, 
departure from the comprehensive plan, improper restriction of the police 
power by contract, and violation of uniformity. As authority for its rejection 
of conditional zoning, the court relied on a decision by the Supreme Court of 
Suffolk County, New York, in Church v. Town of Islip, 160 N.Y.S.2d 45 
(1956), rev 'd, 190 N. Y.S.2d 297 (1959), which had invalidated a rezoning on 
similar grounds. The reliance on Church was misplaced as the New York Court 
of Appeals subsequently reversed the lower court ruling and upheld conditional 
zoning as a valid form of flexible zoning inherently authorized by the standard 
enabling act, not violative of uniformity or notions of spot zoning, and not a 
form of contract zoning. Church v. Town of Islip, 168 N.E.2d 680 (N.Y. 
1960). The approval of conditional zoning in New York was further explained 
in Collard v. Incorporated Village of Flower Hill, 421 N.E.2d 818 (N.Y. 1981), 
and . represents a growing trend of decisions supporting conditional zoning as 
a flexible zoning tool necessary for the general welfare. See 2 RATHKOPF, supra 
note 114, §§ 29A.02[3], 29A.03[I][cj. The New York Court of Appeals in 
Collard provided a persuasive rationale for the use of conditional zoning: 
Conditional rezoning is a means of achieving some degree of flexibility 
in land use control by minimizing the potentially deleterious effect of 
a zoning change on neighboring properties; reasonably conceived 
conditions harmonize the land owner's need for rezoning with the 
public interest and certainly fall within the spirit of the enabling 
legislation. 
Collard, 421 N.E.2d at 822. 
393. H.D. 1195, 1992 Sess. (Md. 1992). 
394. H.D. 457, 1992 Sess. (Md. 1992). 
395. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, §§ 3.05(b), 3.06(b), 4.09 (1988 & Supp. 1994). 
396. 2 RATHKOPF, supra note 114, § 29A.01[c). 
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different from the surrounding area,397 and is only invalid in Mary-
land when it is applied solely for the benefit of the property owner 
without any relationship to the comprehensive plan or the general 
welfare. 398 Contract zoning, which involves a bargain between the 
land owner and the zoning authority, is often confused with condi-
tional use zoning that does not involve prospective commitments. 399 
Unlike contract zoning, conditional zoning does not bargain away 
the police powers and the zoning can be changed in the future 
without regard to the condition. 400 While uniformity is required under 
the enabling law,401 courts have not applied it in a strict manner and 
have permitted mixed uses, cluster development, and variations in 
density or bulk that are the very characteristics of the newly author-
ized flexible techniques most vulnerable to the conditional zoning 
doctrine. 402 
Conditional use zoning, applied with appropriate safeguards, is 
a modern technique that is consistent with sound planning and zoning 
objectives.403 The General Assembly authorized its use in 1975 and 
presumably overcame the limitations of common-law doctrine. How-
ever, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland applied a narrow 
interpretation to the legislation in Board oj County Commissioner 
v. H. Manny Holtz, Inc. 404 In Holtz, the Board of County Commis-
sioner, which acts as the zoning authority for Washington County, 
approved a commercial zoning classification with conditions prohib-
iting a convenience store and several other uses normally permitted 
under the commercial zoning district.405 The use conditions were 
imposed on an ad hoc basis without prior notice, in apparent violation 
of notice requirements. 406 The trial court upheld the rezoning but 
found the conditions in violation of the uniformity provision and 
removed them from the rezoning.407 
397. See Tennison v. Shomette, 38 Md. App. I, 379 A.2d 187 (1977); City of 
Baltimore v. Byrd, 191 Md. 632, 62 A.2d 588 (1948). 
398. Cassel v. City of Baltimore, 195 Md. 348, 73 A.2d 486 (1950). 
399. Collard v. Incorporated Village of Flower Hill, 421 N.E.2d 818 (N.Y. 1981); 
RATHKOPF, supra note 114, § 29A.03[I][bl. 
400. Cassel v. City of Baltimore, 195 Md. 348, 73 A.2d 486 (1950). 
401. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 4.02(a) (1988). 
402. Montgomery County v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 280 Md. 686, 376 A.2d 
483 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1067 (1978); Prince George's County v. M 
& B Constr. Corp., 267 Md. 338, 297 A.2d 683 (1972); Malmar Assocs. v. 
Board of County Comm'rs, 260 Md. 292, 272 A.2d 6 (1971); Ellicott v. 
Baltimore, 180 Md. 176, 23 A.2d 649 (1942); Wesley Inv. Co. v. County of 
Alameda, 198 Cal. Rptr. 872 (Cal. App. 1984). 
403. RATHKOPF, supra note 114, § 29A.02[3]. 
404. 65 Md. App. 574, 501 A.2d 489 (1985). 
405. Id. at 576-77, 501 A.2d at 490. 
406. Id. at 577, 501 A.2d at 490. 
407. Id. at 579, 501 A.2d at 491. 
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The court of special appeals affirmed by holding that the con-
ditional zoning authority contained in state law only applies to 
physical restrictions and not use.408 The court found that the au-
thorization language is limited to design issues only and the permitted 
uses of the zoning district must be evaluated under the uniformity 
provisions. 409 The court found that the uniformity requirement pro-
hibits haphazard application of use conditions which could establish 
an endless variety of mini-use districts and undermine the very nature 
of zoning.410 Acknowledging the desirability of conditional zoning as 
a flexible zoning tool, the court observed that conditional use zoning 
might be applied by charter counties or under a floating zone 
scheme.411 Holtz could have been decided on narrower grounds 
because of the apparent failure of the zoning authority to comply 
with the notice requirements of the conditional zoning authoriza-
tion .412 Instead, the court proceeded to formulate a substantive pro-
hibition against conditional use zoning and created a potential 
impediment for flexible techniques at a time when they are needed 
to cope with the problems of unregulated growth. 
The Holtz doctrine is unsound because it failed to distinguish 
between two purposes of the authorization language. For example, 
the first purpose of the authorization provides the zoning authority 
with wide discretion to impose any condition deemed appropriate to 
preserve, improve, or protect the character and design of the area.413 
This language does not distinguish between conditions on use or 
design and seems to authorize both. Certain conditions on use are 
appropriate to preserve, improve, and protect the character of an 
area. The second purpose of the law reserves the opportunity for 
post-zoning design review. 414 The two purposes are clearly designed 
for two different functions and to be applied at different times. 
Nevertheless, the Holtz court seemed to read the two purposes as a 
single authorization for conditions on design. The court's reliance 
on uniformity takes an overly strict view of a provision that has not 
been applied in this manner because variations in use have been 
408. Id. at 582, 501 A.2d at 492. 
409. Id. at 585-87, 501 A.2d 494-95; see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 668, § 4.02(a) 
(1988 & Supp. 1994). 
410. 65 Md. App. at 584-85, 501 A.2d at 494. Flexible techniques, of course, allow 
different forms of development for different locations and could be vulnerable 
to the charge that each different form of development constitutes a mini-use 
district. Mini-use districts do not undermine the integrity of zoning if consistent 
with the comprehensive plan. 
411. Id. at 586, 501 A.2d at 495. 
412. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 668, § 4.01(b) (1988 & Supp. 1994) (element [3]) 
(see supra note 389 for text of statute). 
413. Id. (element [I». 
414. Id. (element [2». 
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consistently upheld as valid zoning. 415 Moreover, the uniformity clause 
does not contain any basis to distinguish between conditions on use 
or physical characteristics.416 
Holtz was followed in People's Counsel jor Baltimore County 
v. Mockard,417 where the zoning authority granted rezoning restricted 
to a specific use. Baltimore County is a charter county and adopted 
a form of site plan zoning presumably exempt from the Holtz 
doctrine. The applicant did not request the site plan zoning and the 
Board of Appeals applied conditions on use which the court found 
to be invalid.418 Holtz was followed again in Rodriguez v. Prince 
George's County, 419 where the zoning authority applied a PUD-type 
floating zone that was based on a development plan that contained 
restrictions on uses and other development characteristics. The court 
again invalidated the zoning because of the condition on use.420 The 
Holtz doctrine has yet to be addressed by the Court of Appeals of 
MarylandYI 
The need to clarify the authority for conditional use zoning is 
important and legislative action is necessary. State law should be 
amended to explicitly authorize the imposition of conditional use 
zoning so that the flexible techniques designed to implement the state 
growth policy can be applied without threat of invalidation under an 
outdated common-law doctrine. 
D. Vested Rights 
The vested rights doctrine limits retroactive application of new 
land use regulations on property.422 The purpose of the doctrine is 
to provide eligible property owners with some entitlement under 
regulations existing at a time when they took steps to develop their 
property.423 
Zoning does not confer any vested rights. 424 Property owners are 
at risk when they fail to develop property under current zoning 
415. See supra note 402. 
416. Compare MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 4.01(b) with § 4.02 (1988 & Supp. 1994). 
417. 73 Md. App. 340, 533 A.2d 1344 (1987). 
418. [d. 
419. 79 Md. App. 537, 558 A.2d 742 (1989). 
420. [d. at 551-52, 558 A.2d at 749. 
421. The court of appeals, however, subsequently acknowledged that conditional 
zoning as authorized by statute is on the ascendancy. See Attman/Glazer P.B. 
Co. v. Mayor of Annapolis, 314 Md. 675, 686 n.8, 552 A.2d 1277, 1283 n.8 
(1989). 
422. Dainese v. Cooke, 91 U.S. 580 (1875), appears to be the first decision of the 
United States Supreme Court to recognize vested rights. 
423. Delaney, supra note 188, at 51-52; 4 RATHKOPF, supra note 114, § 50.01. 
424. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
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because it may be changed to more restrictive zoning and the owner 
is bound by the new regulation. 425 Vested rights only accrue when 
the property owner exhibits some intention to develop the property 
and expends some effort to that end.426 Depending on state policy, 
vested rights will accrue sometime between the time the property 
owner applies for a building permit427 and actually begins construc-
tion.428 
Establishing the time of vesting involves several policy consid-
erations. Late vesting rules apply when construction is actually ini-
tiated.429 Late vesting rules are based on concerns that nonconforming 
uses will be created that are generally considered contrary to public 
policy,430 and the granting of vested rights too early in the develop-
ment process may undermine the public policy basis for the new 
regulations. 431 Under late vesting rules, developers are considered no 
more burdened by new regulations than changed economic conditions 
and they can make necessary adjustments. 432 Late vesting rules indi-
cate a preference for public policy over individual property owner 
considerations. 
Early vesting rules accommodate situations where developers 
expend money and effort on preliminary work and these rules protect 
the investment by applying the existing regulations at an early stage 
425. Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 553 P.2d 
546 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083 (1977). 
426. Delaney, supra note 188, at 51-52. 
427. Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980); Hull 
v. Hunt, 331 P.2d 856 (Wash. 1958) (vest at time of application). An inter-
mediate rule permits vested rights if substantial change occurs in the developer's 
position without notice of pending change in regulations. See Cos Corp. v. 
City of Evanston, 190 N.E.2d 364 (Ill. 1963); Village of Palatine v. LaSalle 
Nat'l Bank, 445 N.E.2d 1277 (Ill. App. 1983). 
428. In Maryland vested rights are strictly limited to circumstances where construc-
tion is started pursuant to a validly issued building permit. See 0' Donnell v. 
Bassler, 289 Md. 501,425 A.2d 1003 (1981); Prince George's County v. Sunrise 
Dev. Ltd. Partnership, 330 Md. 297, 623 A.2d. 1296 (1993); County Council 
v. District Land Corp., 274 Md. 691, 337 A.2d 712 (1975). Some jurisdictions 
do not permit vested rights until the final discretionary approval. Aries Dev. 
Co. v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 122 Cal. Rptr. 315 
(1975); Youngblood v. Board of Super. of San Diego County, 586 P.2d 586 
(Cal. 1978); County of Kauai v. Pacific Std. Life Ins. Co., 653 P.2d 766 
(Haw. 1982), appeal dismissed sub nom., Pacific Std. Life Ins. Co. v. Com-
mittee to Save Nukolii, 60 U.S. 1077 (1983). 
429. Delaney, supra note 188, at 51-52. 
430. County Council v. E.L. Gardner, Inc., 293 Md. 259, 443 A.2d 114 (1982); 
Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980). 
431. 4 RATHKoPF, supra note 114, § 50.03[3]; Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City 
of Logan, 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980). 
432. County Council v. E.L. Gardner, Inc., 293 Md. 259, 443 A.2d 114 (1982); 
Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980). 
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in the development process, such as the point of building permit 
application. 433 Early vesting rules also recognize that political pres-
sures may develop during the early stages of a project that cause the 
government to change regulations for the purpose of unfairly blocking 
the project.434 
Maryland follows a strict late vesting rule that requires substan-
tial beginnings in construction to be made under a validly issued 
permit which is readily seen by the public. 435 The visibility requirement 
was recently reaffirmed in Prince George's County v. Sunrise Devel-
opment Limited Partnership.436 This strict rule causes a problem for 
the use of flexible zoning especially in cases where development 
projects are staged over time as with a large PUD. Developers often 
provide substantial public facilities before more profitable stages of 
construction commence. For example, a developer may provide roads, 
sewers, and recreational amenities based on the expectation that 
certain levels of density will be approved under the existing regula-
tions as the project builds out to completion.437 If regulations are 
subsequently changed to a lower density and vested rights in the old 
regulations are not applied, the developer loses the expected density 
which supported the amenities or facilities already built. 438 Strict 
vesting rules may create a disincentive for the use of flexible tech-
niques designed to promote the state growth policy. 
433. 4 RATHKOPF, supra note 114, § 50.03(1). 
434. An example of the problems that political pressure may create for a developer 
is illustrated by the egregious fact pattern in Prince George's County v. 
Blumberg, 288 Md. 275, 418 A.2d 1155 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083 
(1981), where the developer started to build out a properly authorized project 
only to experience questionable permit revocations by local government brought 
on by political opposition to the project. 
435. Offen v. County Council, 96 Md. App. 526, 625 A.2d 424 (1993), rev'd on 
other grounds, 334 Md. 499, 639 A.2d 1070 (1994). 
436. 330 Md. 297,623 A.2d 1296 (1993). 
437. Another risk for developers involves financing the.project and lenders' concerns 
about certainty. Vested rights assume a valid permit but later invalidation can 
terminate vested rights. Parkview Assocs. v. City of New York, 519 N.E.2d 
1372 (N.Y. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 801 (1988); see William C. Haas & 
Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117 (9th Cir 1979), cert. 
denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980); United Parcel Service, Inc. v. People's Counsel 
for Baltimore County, 93 Md. App. 59, 611 A.2d 993 (1992), rev'd, 336 Md. 
569, 650 A.2d 226 (1994). Even with a valid permit in Maryland, vested rights 
are not created without construction. Francis v. MacGill, 196 Md. 77, 75 A.2d 
91 (1950). 
438. An example of this situation is illustrated in Hamilton Bank v. Williamson 
County Regional Planning Commission, 729 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 
473 U.S. 172 (1985), where the developer provided infrastructure but was 
denied expected density approvals and subsequently lost the project through 
bankruptcy. 
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In egregious situations where the regulations are changed under 
circumstances where a developer relied on government actions or 
tried to implement old regulations only to be deliberately thwarted 
by government delaying tactics, relief may be provided by some form 
of estoppel or due process remedy.439 This type of relief, however, 
is uncertain and involves expensive litigation.440 
A better approach involves the use of development agreements 
that establish the rights of the developer under existing regulations 
in exchange for the public amenities and facilities to be provided 
under the agreement. 441 These agreements, however, may be vulner-
able to attack under the conditional zoning doctrine and based on 
the lack of authority by the local government. Development agree-
ments have been authorized in Arizona, California, Colorado, Flor-
ida, Hawaii, and Nevada.442 Maryland should join this growing list 
of states and authorize development agreements. 443 The authorization 
will encourage use of flexible techniques and enhance local govern-
ments' ability to enter into public-private sector agreements to provide 
needed public facilities and other amenities that will promote the 
state growth policy. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The Chesapeake Bay is a major economic and recreational 
resource for the region. Yet its environmental health is threatened 
by poor land use regulation. Unmanaged growth is consuming huge 
439. Estoppel is applied as a remedy. See Permanent Financial Corp. v. Montgomery 
County, 308 Md. 239, 518 A.2d 123 (1986) (reliance on building permit issued 
with reasonable interpretation will estop county from using different interpre-
tation later); County of Charleston v. National Advertising Co., 357 S.E.2d 9 
(S.c. 1987) (permit issued within general scope of authority and relied upon 
to the developer's detriment will raise estoppel defense if permit later revoked); 
4 RATHKOPF, supra note 114, § 50.04[1]. Maryland has not yet adopted zoning 
estoppel. See County Council v. Offen, 334 Md. 499, 639 A.2d 1070 (1994). 
Due process also provides relief for abusive government conduct. Bateson v. 
Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1988); He~rington v. Sonoma County, 834 
F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1090 (1989). 
440. See Offen v. County Council, 96 Md. App. 526, 625 A.2d 424 (1993), rev'd 
on other grounds, 334 Md. 499, 639 A.2d 1070 (1994). 
441. Delaney, supra note 188; 2 RATHKOPF, supra note 114, § 29A.03[1][g]. For a 
thorough discussion of development agreements, see Patricia G. Hammes, 
Development Agreements: The Intersection oj Real Estate Finance and Land 
Use Controls, 23 U. BALT. L. REV. 119 (1993). 
442. 2 RATHKOPF, supra note 114, § 29A.03[I][g] n.49. 
443. An authorization for development agreements is preferable to legislative mod-
ification of the Maryland Vested Rights Doctrine which is based on long 
standing public policy considerations. Developers sought such a modification 
in 1994, but the effort was unsuccessful. Paul D. Samuel, Vested .Development 
Rights Become Issue in Legislation, DAILY RECORD, March 21, 1994, at 9. 
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chunks of farmland, forests, and environmentally sensitive areas. 
Lax regulatory patterns also place unanticipated burdens on local 
governments to provide adequate roads, schools, and other public 
facilities or services while other more suitable areas are bypassed. 
Growth must be redirected to areas more suitable for development 
and the current pattern of sprawl development, which represents a 
major factor in pollution of the Bay, must be eliminated. 
The new Planning Act contains important measures that address 
these problems: a bold new land use policy to concentrate growth 
only in areas where it makes sense and'to protect areas where it does 
not, mandatory application of the policy to local governments, and 
a mechanism for state oversight through a new Planning Commission 
which will evaluate the consistency between state policy and local 
actions. This policy of sensible and managed growth means substan-
tial changes must be made in the way land use is regulated and local 
governments must clearly define designated growth and protected 
areas and adopt regulations necessary to insure that state policy will 
be applied to these areas. The new state policy seeks to eliminate 
sprawl development, the most environmentally destructive form of 
development, and its success depends on effective implementation 
programs. 
The goals of state policy far exceed the capacity of the admin-
istrative framework designed to achieve them and, in this respect, 
the legislation is incomplete. Full implementation of state policy 
cannot be achieved without adequate standards, incentives, enforce-
ment provisions, and a dispute resolution process. These measures 
are needed to insure that state policy is applied as it is intended. 
The Planning Commission's initial oversight activities are limited to 
development of guidelines, initiation of cooperative efforts between 
state and local governments, and critical evaluation of compliance 
with state policy. The Commission lacks both rule-making power 
and enforcement authority necessary to change existing patterns of 
sprawl development that will likely continue unless local governments 
are provided incentives and guidance as to how to redirect growth. 
The requirement for consistency between state policy and local 
actions is critical to the effectiveness of the Planning Act. The growth 
policy is made mandatory on local governments through the consis-
tency requirement and it will determine the credibility of the current 
legislative approach. However, the legislation neglects to insure that 
local plans and regulations are truly consistent with state policy and 
not fragmented or ineffective. Without more Commission empow-
erment and a dispute resolution process to address conflicts in the 
consistency determination, achieving consistency between state policy 
and local actions will be a formidable, if not impossible, task. 
New, flexible techniques are made available for local govern-
ments to assist in the implementation of the state growth policy. 
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State policy requires growth to be concentrated in suitable areas 
under streamlined procedures. One flexible technique that promotes 
this objective is innovative zoning which is designed to provide varied 
uses and densities, more efficient use of land, environmentally sen-
sitive development, a range of community amenities, and a stream-
lined process. However, the application of innovative zoning techniques 
by local governments is discretionary and the Commission needs 
empowerment to develop incentives for their use. Legislation revisions 
are also necessary to broaden the basis for application of Euclidean 
zoning and eliminate a requirement for a finding of change or mistake 
by non-charter counties and municipalities when applying floating 
zones. 
Affordable housing is another objective of state law and its need 
is well established. While affordable housing was included as part of 
the state growth policy, the legislation neglects to make it a man-
datory element of local comprehensive plans and lacks incentives for 
local governments to adopt affordable housing programs. Legislative 
revisions are needed to include affordable housing as a mandatory 
element of local comprehensive plans and empower the Commission 
to establish minimum levels of participation. 
State policy requires resource conservation and protection of 
sensitive areas that can only be achieved through protective zoning 
with density levels low enough to discourage sprawl development and 
yet provide a reasonable use .of the land. Few local governments 
have adopted protective zoning measures and the Planning Act 
neglects to provide either standards or incentives for its wider use. 
Protective zoning represents one of the most controversial aspects of 
any resource conservation program, but it is absolutely necessary if 
the state growth policy is to be achieved. The use of TDRs provides 
a measure of relief for property owners burdened by protective 
zoning. The Commission must be empowered to develop standards 
and incentives to promote this aspect of state policy. 
The original Visions of 2020 contemplated a policy that funding 
mechanisms be in place to support growth. The Planning Act rep-
resents a substantial retreat from this policy that needs to be restored 
so that growth only takes place where it is suitable; that is, where 
public facilities and services are adequate. Local governments need 
standards and incentives to adopt growth management regulations 
that provide the basis for funding mechanisms involving participation 
of the private as well as public sectors. 
Potential impediments to the achievement of state policy, such 
as represented by the takings challenge and the shifting presumption 
of validity, can best be addressed by providing local governments 
with clear policy direction and incentives to use new flexible tech-
niques. Conditional zoning and vested rights doctrines operate as 
detriments to the effective use of the new flexible techniques, and 
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further legislation is necessary to authorize both conditional uses and 
development agreements. 
The Planning Act represents a modest beginning in the unfinished 
process of significantly increasing the state's role in land use planning 
and regulation. Current deficiencies in the law need to be promptly 
corrected before damage caused by unmanaged growth takes too 
great a toll on the environment and an opportunity to correct 
destructive land use practices is irretrievably lost. The bold promises 
encapsulated in the state growth policy require equally bold imple-
mentation measures if local governments are to change the way they 
regulate land use and require more sensible development patterns. 
